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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation includes two related chapters that analyze financial condition of 
firms. In the first chapter, I examine the relationship between the firms’ level of cash 
holdings and governance. The findings show that higher levels of cash holdings are 
significantly related to strong governance. The results also show that firms with strong 
governance hold asymmetrically higher levels of cash than firms with weak governance 
when they have high growth opportunities. Furthermore, I also test the impact of 
financial constraint status of the firm on the level of cash holdings for both good and 
poorly governed firms separately. The results suggest that strong governance firms hold 
higher levels of cash to use as financial slack in order to avoid financial distress. In the 
second essay I examine if a firm’s success in leaving distress is explained by firm 
characteristics and manager decisions. I proxy the managers’ decisions by measuring 
changes in operating, investing, and financing choice variables. Timely decisions with 
regard to product refinement, proxied by increased investment in research and 
development and reduction in capital expenditures, increase the probability of successful 
turnaround. Further the results show that increased financing through additional sale of 
equity, acquisitions and sale of assets do not help a firm exit financial distress. 
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Essay 1 
Is the Level of Cash Holdings Influenced by Corporate Governance? 
1.1  Introduction 
Corporate liquidity enables firms to make investments when opportunities arise 
without the need to access external capital markets (Keynes, 1936), thereby avoiding 
transactions costs and the costs of information asymmetries often associated with equity 
issuances. On the contrary, the agency argument against padding up cash states that 
additional cash in the hands of managers will be misused (Jensen, 1986). Typically, the 
intuitive notion is agency costs are real and it would be more valuable to put cash into use 
making a positive return instead of keeping for manager discretion. Given this idea it is 
surprising to see firms increasing their cash holdings as a percentage of total assets on 
average in recent times (Ditmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). I examine cash holdings to 
determine if it is driven by firm interest or manager interest. In other words, is the 
increase in cash holdings a manifestation of agency costs or manager identification of a 
new effective use of cash? 
To determine if increased cash holdings are pro-firm or anti-firm I turn to firm 
governance. All else equal, firms with better governance should act more in the interest 
of shareholders than firms with poor governance. In the same vein, managers who are 
less entrenched should act more in line with the interests of shareholders as compared to 
firms with deeply entrenched managers. Given the ability of governance to force 
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managers to act in the best interests of shareholders, if firm governance is positively 
related to cash holdings then the recent increase in cash holdings may be a positive 
development. On the other hand, if firm governance is negatively related to cash holdings 
then the trend of increased cash holdings may be a reflection of agency problems. In this 
paper, I attempt to address the following questions. Do firms with strong or poor 
governance hold more cash, and if so, why does governance influence cash holdings?  
Managers who maximize shareholder wealth should set the firm’s cash holdings 
at a level where the marginal benefit of cash holdings equals the marginal cost (Opler et 
al., 1999). The potential benefits of holding more cash are found to be increased financial 
slack and lower risk with higher liquidity. Financial slack and higher liquidity will allow 
firms to take advantage of more opportunities (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and avoid 
financial troubles. The costs of holding liquid assets are lower returns, higher taxation on 
the interest, and perhaps the most dangerous is an increase in agency costs (Jensen 
(1986); Stulz (1990)). Available funds provide managers the ability to invest in projects 
providing pecuniary benefits, thus increasing agency costs. Increased agency costs have 
been shown to affect firm performance adversely.   
Given the tradeoff between the benefits and costs of holding cash, I find evidence 
that the higher levels of cash holdings are not, on average, associated with higher agency 
problems. The results illustrate increased cash holdings are positively related with 
governance, as firms with strong governance hold significantly more cash as a percentage 
of assets. I find this result to be robust to two different measures of firm governance, 
Gompers, et al (2003) Governance (G-index) and the Bebchuck, et al. (2005) 
Entrenchment index (E-index). I also find this difference to be robust after using 
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numerous controls to measure the differences between firms with strong and poor 
governance, including documented performance differences by controlling for firm cash 
flows. Firms with better governance are able to reduce the marginal cost of carrying cash, 
thus increasing the value of cash. The results of this paper are consistent with the value of 
cash when in the hands of strong (well governed) managers. Next, I turn my attention to 
why do firms with strong governance hold more cash?  
To explain the large difference in cash holdings between firms with strong versus 
poor governance, I hypothesize that firms with strong governance will increase their cash 
holdings when it makes sense to do so. Firms with strong governance will take advantage 
of the benefits of holding cash such as increased financial slack during times of higher 
growth opportunities and will increase cash when free of financial constraint. The results 
are consistent with this idea as they show firms with strong governance hold higher levels 
of cash when they have good investment opportunities. While the findings show that both 
well and poorly governed firms hold larger percentages of cash when they have increased 
growth opportunities, firms with strong governance hold asymmetrically higher amounts 
than firms with poor governance. The results also demonstrate that firms with strong 
governance do not significantly increase their cash holdings when they do not have 
strong growth opportunities. Another potential reason for higher levels of cash holdings 
by strong governance firms is to build up slack in order to avoid financial pitfalls 
(Lamont, 1997), classified in this paper as financial constraint or distress. I find strong 
governance firms invariably vary the level of cash holdings in times of financial 
constraint while poor governance firms appear to use up cash and hold low levels of cash 
holdings, whether they are financially constrained or not.   
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This paper adds to the current literature in two different areas. The first area looks 
at the importance and value of cash to firms (Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007). I build 
on the idea of Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999). They show that managers 
maximize shareholder wealth by setting the firm’s cash holdings at a level such that the 
marginal benefit of cash holdings equals the marginal cost of those holdings. I show firm 
governance can mitigate agency issues and increase the value of cash holdings, thus 
offering an explanation for the observed trend of higher cash holdings seen in recent 
times. I also add to the literature emphasizing the importance of corporate governance 
and agency issues in the workings of modern corporations. Prior research focuses on the 
impact of governance mechanisms on (i) firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1991, Bhagat and Black, 2002 and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003), (ii) acquisition 
activity (Byrd and Hickman, 1992), (iii) over investment of free-cash flow (Richardson, 
2006), (iv) diversification discount (Jiraporn, Kim and Davidson, 2006) and (v) write-offs 
(Minnick, 2004). I add to this literature by investigating how the quality of corporate 
governance can influence a firm’s level of cash holdings. The results of this paper are 
consistent with the work of Gompers, Ishii, and Metric (2003) and provide some potential 
insight as to how firms with strong governance can lead to increases in stock returns.  
I also add another side to the results of Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). Their 
study focuses on the value effects of governance on cash resources by analyzing how a 
change in cash holdings leads to a change in the market valuation of a firm. They find a 
positive and significant difference in the change in valuation of firm under the influence 
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of a strong governance policy. They also value the excess cash1 for poor and well 
governed firms and find that well governed firms have double the value of cash as 
compared to poorly governed firms. Based on these findings, they illustrate governance 
as having a relatively minor impact on how firms accumulate cash, but a significant 
impact on how firms spend their money.  
Harford, et al. (2008) also study how agency problems affect cash holdings of 
firms. Their study primarily comments on the behavior and policy issues observed for 
poor governance firms with respect to the use of excess cash holdings. In analyzing the 
differences in cash holdings of strong and poorly governed firms, they focus on the 
investment behavior and pay out policies of their sample firms. Their results show that 
firms with higher levels of excess cash and poor governance increase capital 
expenditures, increase acquisition activity and disburse excess cash to shareholders as 
share repurchases, thus exhibiting a less commitment behavior. Firms with excess cash 
and good governance disburse cash to shareholders by initiating or increasing dividends. 
While Harford et al. (2008)  address how firms with poor governance end up with lower 
levels of cash holdings, my paper attempts to address why firms with different 
governance structures tend to hold different levels of cash holdings by analyzing the 
impact of growth opportunities of firms.  Consistent with Harford et al. (2008), my initial 
results show that good governance firms with better growth opportunities hold higher 
levels of cash holdings. I examine the role of growth opportunities further by separating 
the sample into groups of high, average and low growth firms (Growth opportunities 
                                                 
1 Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith define excess cash as cash reserves held in excess of those needed for 
operations and investments.  
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proxied by Q). I run my tests on these three sub samples and find that only well governed 
firms with high and average growth opportunities tend to hold higher levels of cash 
holdings. Good governance firms with low Q values do not significantly hold higher cash 
holdings. This analysis provides new evidence on the interaction of firm growth and 
governance in influencing cash holdings. Another important distinction this paper has 
from the Harford et al. paper is about the explanation of the role of financial constraints 
for good and poor governance firms with respect to the cash holdings. After showing that 
financially unconstrained firms hold higher levels of cash holdings on average, I further 
explore the role of financial constraints and governance on firm’s cash holdings. The 
results show that firm governance influences cash holdings only for financially 
unconstrained firms. Further tests reveal that financially unconstrained and well governed 
firms hold higher level of cash holdings as compared to well governed and financially 
constrained firms. Firms with poor governance hold lower cash holdings, whether they 
are financially constrained or not. That is, this study identifies situations where strong 
governance firms hold more cash and poses explanations for the significant difference 
between the average cash holding of firms with strong versus weak governance.  
The next section reviews the related literature and section III addresses the issues 
with sample construction. Section IV comments on the observations made on summary 
statistics, and discusses the results of the empirical tests and robustness tests and section 
V concludes.  
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1.2  Related Literature 
Managers and shareholders view the costs and benefits of liquid asset holdings 
differently. Managers have greater preference for cash, because it reduces firm risk and 
increases their discretion. Opler et al. (1999) state that “As long as there is any cost to 
holding cash, a firm that simply accumulates cash will at some point have an excessive 
amount of cash, and shareholders would be better off if the firm used that cash to pay 
additional dividends or to repurchase shares.” Analysis of investment decisions of firms 
occupies a prominent place in research programs in economics and corporate finance. 
Starting with Modigliani and Miller (1958) a vast amount of finance literature focuses on 
the pace and pattern of business investment in fixed capital. This paper belongs to the 
subset of this literature that treats cash holdings as investment in cash asset. Asymmetric 
information2 raises complications concerning the optimal choice of the financing method 
and the appropriate discount rate to use in present value calculations when evaluating 
investments. Investment expenditures in fixed capital and net working capital reduce 
dependence on external financing in presence of higher levels of cash holdings by firms. 
This analysis lends support for the argument that the level of cash holdings of a firm 
helps determine both the future growth and its ability to sustain downturns. 
1.2.1 Costly External Financing   
 An important insight, due to Myers and Majluf (1984), Myers (1984) and 
Greenwald, and Stiglitz and Weiss (1984), is that raising equity externally will generally 
be problematic due to an adverse-selection problem of the sort first identified by Akerlof 
                                                 
2 Asymmetric information problems in capital markets: Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984), Myers and 
Majluf (1984), Myers (1984), et al. 
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(1970). Of course, an inability to access new equity would not compromise investment if 
firms could frictionlessly raise unlimited amounts of debt financing. However, a variety 
of theories suggest that this is unlikely to be the case. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1983) and 
others, show that the same adverse-selection problem can lead to credit rationing, 
whereby firms are simply unable to obtain all the debt financing they would like at the 
prevailing market interest rate. Myers (1977), examines the impact of conflicts between 
firms’ claimholders on their investment decisions leading to debt ‘overhang’ and hence 
underinvestment. Thus, cash reserves provide benefits to equity holders by reducing the 
underinvestment problem. Managers wishing to avoid the costs associated with external 
financing in an imperfect information environment find it optimal to maintain sufficient 
internal financial flexibility to allow them to reduce the underinvestment problem. 
Further, since the equity holders suffer the loss from underinvestment, they find it value 
increasing for managers to maintain the buffer stock of cash. 
1.2.2 Costs and Benefits of Liquid Asset Holdings 
Chudson (1945) suggests that cash-to-assets ratios tend to vary systematically by 
industry, and tend to be higher among profitable companies. Vogel and Maddala (1967) 
show that cash balances declined over the time frame they examined, especially for larger 
firms. The more recent research papers have focused on the corporate actions resulting 
from high liquid asset holdings. Baskin (1987) highlights that firms use cash holdings for 
competitive purposes and Harford (1999) shows that cash-rich firms are more likely to 
make acquisitions. Opler et al (1999) analyze the benefits of liquid assets holdings under 
two different motivations. (i) Transaction cost motive – a firm saves transaction costs to 
raise funds and does not have to liquidate assets to make payments, and (ii) Precautionary 
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motive – firm can use the liquid assets to finance its activities and investments if other 
sources of funding are not available or are excessively costly. Recent literature has 
focused on the relation between cash holdings and its impact on the value of firm. 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) argue that the value of one additional dollar of cash 
reserves varies with its intended use. They analyze three specific uses: (1) paying back to 
shareholders in the form of dividends, (2) capital spending and (3) repaying debt or other 
obligations. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) explore this issue further by asking “How 
does corporate governance impact the value of the firm and eventual use of cash 
reserves?” They document value destruction and performance declines of poorly 
governed, cash rich firms. Similarly Harford et al (2008) analyze how agency problems 
affect the propensity to stockpile cash in the US. They primarily find that poorly 
governed firms dissipate cash more quickly either by increasing investments, acquisition 
activity or exercising a payout policy of stock repurchases. My paper results concur with 
earlier literature and additionally I focus on the motivation issues behind the reasons for 
higher cash holdings by good governance firms.  This paper adds to this line of literature, 
by extending the discussion to include arguments for explaining the circumstances as to 
when it is appropriate for good governance firms to hold higher level of cash holdings  
1.2.3 Investments and Financing Constraints 
 A common way of examining the impact of financial constraints in firms’ 
investment choices empirically was pioneered by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). 
Using a-priori criterion that relates to the gap between the costs of external financing and 
available internal funds, firms are categorized into classes of more- or less financially 
constrained. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) estimate the investment-cash flow 
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sensitivities of Japanese companies and find that firms, which are associated with 
keiretsu3 groups, have significantly lower sensitivities. Whited (1992) uses a financial 
constraint premise in that small firms with low liquid asset positions have limited access 
to debt markets, because they lack collateral necessary to back up their borrowing. Her 
study finds the exogenous finance constraint to be particularly binding for the constrained 
group of firms. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) find that firms with access to 
commercial paper and bond markets plan their investments independent of firm’s cash 
flows for the period.  However, for firms with only limited access to capital markets (as 
indicated by lack of participation in public debt markets), investment in the firm tends to 
be ‘excessively’ sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow. Lamont (1997) shows that firms 
faced with a cash flow shock in their core business reduce investment in core and non-
core segments. These and other studies found that the association between investment 
and cash flow is higher for firms that are expected to be more financially constrained 
according to various a-priori criteria.  
The consensus regarding the positive relation between the degree of financial 
constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivity was disturbed by the influential work of 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997). They show that the theoretical relation between the degree 
of financial constraints and the sensitivity of investment to cash flow does not have to be 
uniformly positive. Kaplan and Zingales support their argument empirically by applying 
subjective criteria to identify financially constrained and unconstrained firms, and 
demonstrating that firms that are less financially constrained exhibit significantly higher 
investment-cash flow sensitivities than those that appear more constrained. Their findings 
                                                 
3 Keiretsu institution coordinates the activities of member firms and finances much of their investment 
activity 
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are supported by Cleary (1999), who uses large samples of U.S. and international firms, 
and reports results that are consistent with Kaplan and Zingales’ findings.  
1.2.4 Corporate Governance Impacting Corporate Finance 
Richardson (2006) examines whether firms’ governance structures are associated 
with over-investment of free cash flow. Prior literature argues that agency conflicts arise 
when firms have free cash flow (e.g., Jensen, 1986, 1993 and Stulz, 1990). Richardson 
finds little systematic evidence that governance structures are determined in response to 
the severity of these agency costs; however, he finds evidence that governance structures 
mitigate over-investment. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) retrace the shift in 
governance structure by analyzing the takeover market since the advent of junk bonds in 
1980s. They argue that the rise of junk bond market enabled hostile-takeover offers for 
even the largest of public firms, in response to which many firms added takeover 
defenses and other restrictions of shareholder rights. They also note that during the same 
time period, many states passed antitakeover laws giving firms further defenses against 
hostile bids. They combine a large set of governance provisions into an index which 
proxies for the strength of shareholder rights, and then study the empirical relationship 
between this index and corporate performance. They find that firms with stronger 
shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower 
capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions. 
Jiraporn, Kim and Davidson (2006) explore the agency theory as an explanation 
for the diversification discount. They empirically examine the potential connections 
between corporate governance, shareholder rights, firm value, and the propensity for a 
firm to be diversified. The governance index developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
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(2003) is employed as the measure of strength of shareholder rights. Their empirical 
studies reveal that firms in which shareholder rights are more suppressed by restrictive 
corporate governance suffer a deeper diversification discount.  
1.3 Sample Construction 
Before addressing the core issues related to data, I first detail information 
regarding the construction of the index used for governance measures. Next I provide 
information regarding the construction of the KZ index used for distinguishing firms as 
financially constrained and unconstrained, followed by the information regarding 
construction of Ohlson’s O score used to identify probability of distress for firms. 
1.3.1 Measure of Governance Characteristics 
To measure the strength of shareholder rights, the database I use employs the G-
Index developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, (2003), henceforth GIM and the E-
Index developed by Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell (2005), henceforth BCF. They both use 
data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which publishes detailed 
listings of corporate governance provisions for individual firms in Corporate Takeover 
Defenses, by Virginia Rosenbaum. The data on governance provisions are derived from 
various sources, such as corporate bylaws, charters, proxy statements, annual reports, as 
well as 10-K and 10-Q documents filed with SEC.  
 The governance Index is constructed as follows: for every firm GIM add one 
point for every provision that restricts shareholder rights (increase managerial power). 
While this index does not accurately reflect the relative impacts of the various provisions, 
it has the advantage of being transparent and easily reproducible. The index does not 
require any judgments about the efficacy or wealth effects of any of these provisions; 
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GIM consider only the impact on the balance of power. To clarify the logic behind the 
construction on the Governance Index, GIM use the following example; consider 
classified boards, a provision that staggers the terms and elections of directors and, thus, 
can be employed to slow down a hostile takeover. If management uses this power 
judiciously, it could possibly lead to an increase in overall shareholder wealth; if 
management, however, uses this power to maintain private benefits of control, then this 
provision would diminish shareholder wealth. Either way, it is apparent that classified 
boards enhance the power of managers and weaken the control rights of large 
shareholders. Hence, the Governance Index captures the balance of power between 
management and shareholder. 
 Most provisions other than classified boards can be viewed with the same logic. 
Almost every provision enables management to resist different types of shareholder 
activism, such as calling special meetings, changing the firm’s charter or bylaws, suing 
the directors, or replacing them all at once. GIM note, however, that there are two 
exceptions, secret ballots (confidential voting) and cumulative voting. A secret ballot 
designates a third party to count proxy votes and, therefore, prevents management from 
observing how specific shareholders vote. Cumulative voting enables shareholders to 
concentrate their director’s votes so that a large minority shareholder can ensure some 
board representation. These two provisions are usually proposed by shareholders and 
opposed by management because they enhance shareholder rights and diminish the power 
of management. Thus, for each one, GIM add one point to the Governance Index when 
firms do not have it. For all other provisions, GIM add one point when firms do have it. 
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In summary, the Governance Index is simply the sum of one point for the presence (or 
absence) of each provision.  
 BCF (2005) argue that there is no a priori reason to expect that all the 24 IRRC 
provisions have equal relevance when measuring firm’s governance. They study which 
IRRC provisions matter to the relationship between corporate governance and firm value. 
Their analysis leads them to identify six provisions that are likely to play a substantial 
role in determining the governance of firms. Based on these six provisions they construct 
an index that they label the ‘entrenchment index”. Each firm in their database is given a 
score, from zero to six, with higher the score indicating deeper entrenchment by the 
managers and hence proxied for poorer governance. 
1.3.2 Measure for Financial Constraints  
In order to study the impact of financial status (constraint / unconstraint), I divide 
the sample into sub samples that face greater financing constraints than others as defined 
by the existing literature. The approach I use to distinguish the sample as financially 
constrained and unconstrained is based on the results of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
study. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) classify firms into discrete categories of financial 
constraint and then use an ordered logit regression to relate their classifications to 
accounting variables. Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001) used these regression 
coefficients to construct an index consisting of a linear combination of five accounting 
ratios, called the KZ index. The KZ index is higher for firms that are more constrained. 
The five variables, along with the signs of their coefficients in the KZ index, are: cash 
flow to total capital (negative), the market to book ratio (positive), debt to total capital 
(positive), dividends to total capital (negative), and cash holdings to capital (negative). 
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Following Lamont, Polk and Saa-Raquejo (2001), I construct the five variable KZ index 
for each firm-year as the following linear combination: 
 KZ Index (five variable) =  -1.002*CashFlow + 0.283*Q + 3.130*Leverage –  
39.368*Dividends – 1.315*CashHoldings.   
I classify the top tercile of all firms in the total sample ranked on the KZ index as 
financially constrained and classify the bottom tercile as financially unconstrained. This 
classification results in 6,153 firm-years as financially constrained and 5,509 firm-years 
as financially unconstrained. 
1.3.3 Measure for Financial Distress 
Ohlson (1980) uses maximum likelihood estimation of the so-called conditional 
logit model to predict corporate failure as evidenced by the event of bankruptcy. They 
identify four basic factors as being statistically significant in affecting the probability of 
failure within one year – (i) size; (ii) measures of financial structure; (iii) measures of 
performance and (iv) measures of current liquidity. In this paper I use Ohlson’s 
probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy measure very closely following Bhagat, Moyen 
and Suh (2005)’s use of the same measure to identify firms in performance declines. This 
measure is based on Ohlson’s predicted bankruptcy probabilities p, where P = 1/(1+e-Yit) 
Yit = -1.32 - .407*(ln (TA)) + 6.03*TLTA – 1.43*WCTA + .757*CLCA – 2.37*NITA – 
1.83*FUTL + .285*INTWO – 1.72OENEG - .521*CHIN 
Wherein TA is total assets (COMPUSTAT #s in parentheses) (#6); TLTA is total 
liabilities to total assets (#181/#6); WCTA is the ratio of working capital to total assets 
[(#4 - #5) / #6]; CLCA is the current liabilities to current assets ratio (#5/#4); NITA is net 
income to total assets ratio (#172/#6) and FUTL is fund from operations to total liabilities 
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ratio (#110/#181). INTWO = 1 if net income (#172) is negative in previous two years or 
zero otherwise; ONEEG = 1 if total liabilities (#181) is greater than total assets (#6), 0 
otherwise and CHIN is the ratio of the difference in net income of current period with 
previous period over the absolute value of the difference (NIt – NIt-1)/ (|NIt| - |NIt-1|). 
Following Bhagat et al (2005) this measure is obtained from a variant of Ohlson’s 
bankruptcy probability model. Because the FUTL variable greatly restricts the sample 
size, pseudo-bankruptcy probabilities ˜p are calculated by ignoring the effect of FUTL in 
predicting bankruptcy probabilities:  ˜p = 1/ (1 + e-Yit) 
Firms with declining performance and facing financial distress include firm-year 
observations with pseudo-bankruptcy probabilities greater than or equal to 50%.  
1.3.4  The Sample Selection Process 
I use the G-index developed by Gompers et al (2003) and E-index developed by 
Bebchuck et al. (2005) as my measures of governance in order to distinguish between 
strong and poorly governed firms. Due to this fact the sample size for this paper is 
constrained by the firm-years for which the G-Index and the E-Index numbers that have 
been computed and provided for research purposes on the respective authors’ homepages. 
The accounting data for the sample comes from the Research Insight – COMPUSTAT 
database (numbers in parentheses are COMPUSTAT data items). I include firms for all 
the years of the sample period (1990-2005) for which t-1 and t-2 COMPUSTAT data is 
available for the said parameters detailed in Table 1. The final sample size is 17,587 firm-
years.  
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Table 1. Variable Definition and Construction 
S.No Variable 
Notation 
Variable Description COMPUSTAT  
Notation 
1. Size Natural logarithm of total assets Ln(#6) 
2. Cash Flow Income before Extraordinary Items + Depreciation and Amortization #18 + #14 
3. Q Market value of assets / Book Value of assets {(#199 * #25) + #6 – (#60 
+ #74)} / #6 
4. Leverage Total Liabilities / Total Assets #181 / #6 
5. KZ -1.002*CashFlow+0.283*Q+3.130*Leverage– 39.368*Dividends – 
1.315*CashHoldings 
Item #8 is a lagged variable. 
  CashFlow (#18 + #14) / #8 
  Q {(#6 + (#25 * #24) – #60 – 
#74)} / #6 
  Leverage (#9 + #34) / (#9 + #34 + 
#216) 
  Dividends (#21 + #19) / #8] 
  CashHoldings #1 / #8 
6. O-Score Yit = -1.32 - .407*(ln(TA)) + 6.03*TLTA – 1.43*WCTA + 
.757*CLCA – 2.37*NITA – 1.83*FUTL + .285*INTWO – 
1.72OENEG - .521*CHIN 
 
 
  Ln(TA)       Ln(#6) 
  TLTA       #181/#6 
  WCTA       (#4 - #5) / #6 
  CLCA        #5/#4 
  NITA 
FUTL 
INTWO 
 
OENEG 
 
CHIN 
       #172/#6 
       #110/#181 
       1 if #172t & #172t-1 
         < 0; 0 otherwise.  
       1 if #181 > #6; 0  
        otherwise.  
        (NIt – NIt-1)/(|NIt| -  
        |NIt-1|) 
7. Cash Holdings {Cash + Mkt Sec}/ {T.A}    [#1 / {#6}] 
8.  Net Assets Book value of Total assets  - Cash & Mkt Sec.     #6 - #1 
9. P/O Ratio Common and preferred dividends / Net Income    (#19 + #21) / #172 
10. NWC {Current assets – Cash & Mkt Sec – Current Liabilities}    {#4 - #1 -  #5} 
                              
11 Acq Acquisitions     #129  
12. CAPEX Capital Expenditures    #128  
13. G-index The Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) Governance Index  
14. E-Index The Bebchuck, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) Entrenchment Index  
15. Strong Gov Firms for which the G number is less than or equal to 7 or E number 
is less than or equal to 2 
 
16. Bad Gov Firms for which the G number is greater than or equal to 12 or E 
number is greater than or equal to 4 
 
This table briefly describes the construction of the control and test variables used in this 
paper. 
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For a firm to be included in the sample in a given year t, it must meet the 
following criteria. (a) It has at least two years of COMPUSTAT data prior to year t for all 
the variables listed in Table 1 and (b) it has to have a governance index (G) score as 
tabulated by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and entrenchment index (E) as tabulated 
by Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell (2005). The G index score have numbers from 0 to 24, 
with the higher the score indicating poor governance. In the construction of the E index 
only a subset of IRRC provisions are used and the index goes from 0 to 6, again with a 
higher index score indicating poor governance. I have made one critical assumption with 
respect to the governance index and the entrenchment index numbers for the firms in my 
sample. Both databases provide index numbers for discrete years such as 1990, 1993, et 
al. It is widely accepted in the governance literature that governance characteristics for 
firms do not change significantly, if at all, from year to year.  
Hence, in order to complete my panel data I make an assumption that G and E 
scores respectively for all firms in the years not tabulated by GIM (2003) and BCF(2005) 
have the same G score and E score respectively as that of the previously reported year 
until new data is available. For example, Amgen Inc., (TIC: AMGN) has a G score 9 in 
year 1993 and 10 in year 1995 as per the GIM (2003) tabulations. Based on my 
assumptions, I tabulate for AMGN a G score of 9 for 1994 and a score of 10 for year 
1996 and 1997. Following this assumption I fill up the G and E scores for the years 1991, 
1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2003. I then classify the firms with a G score4 
                                                 
4 Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) refer to the portfolio of firms with G <= 5 as a “democracy” portfolio 
and a portfolio of firms with G >= 14 as a “dictatorship” portfolio. Harford et al. (2008) sort the GIndex 
into quartiles and term the 1st quartile (strong shareholder rights) as firms' with good governance and the 
4th (weak shareholder rights) quartiles as firms with poor governance. 
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of 7 and less as firms with strong governance and firms with G score of 12 and greater as 
poor governance firms. 
1.3.5 Variable Description 
Table 1 lists all the variables used in this paper. I use the market-to-book ratio as 
measure of a firm’s growth opportunities, since the value of growth options are not 
included in a firm’s book value, but should be reflected in its market value. I define the 
firm’s cash flow as income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization 
charges. A firm’s decision with regard to its holdings of cash is modeled as a function of 
a number of sources and (competing) uses of funds (Almeida et al. 2004). Fazzari and 
Petersen (1993) argue that firms can offset the impact of cash flow shocks on fixed 
investment by adjusting working capital. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) 
find that capital expenditures increase monotonically with excess cash. Harford (1999) 
finds that cash-rich firms tend increase its acquisition activity. I include net working 
capital, which I define as current assets, minus cash and marketable securities, minus 
current liabilities. The control variables net working capital, capital expenditure, 
acquisition, and cash flow are scaled by net assets, which is the book value of total assets 
net of cash. The Governance variables have been borrowed from the Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003) Governance Index and Bebchuck, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) 
Entrenchment Index. Table 1 list each of these variables and very briefly mentions its 
construction methodology.  
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1.4  Empirical Results 
1.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the different variables used in the paper. 
The average cash holdings over the 15-year sample period used is about 0.12. In other 
words, firms hold just under 12 percentage points of their total assets in cash. The next 
two variables examine the governance of firms. First, the G-index developed by 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) is constructed as a proxy for the balance of power 
between shareholders and managers. The average G-index score for the sample is just 
over nine. The E-index developed by Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell (2005) as another 
governance measure, examines the entrenchment level of managers. The average E-index 
score for the sample is around 2.27.  
The two variables, the KZ-index and the probability of distress, focus on 
measuring the level of financial constraint for firms. The average KZ-index5 is about -3.9. 
The distress variables focus on firms taking financial constraint one step further. The 
measure for firm level of distress is the probability of bankruptcy (distress) as measured 
by the Ohlson (1980). The average is 0.31 for this measure.  
The final seven variables are control variables used in the regressions including 
size, cash flow, leverage, Q, net working capital, capital expenditure, and acquisitions. 
Table 2 shows the averages of each of these variables. Table 2 also breaks down the 
sample based on strong and poor governance. Separating the types of governance 
illustrates the major difference in cash holdings between strong and poor governance, 
which is around 7.5 percentage points. 
                                                 
5 The KZ index is constructed by Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001) using results from Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) measures of firm level of financial constraints.  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Full Sample 
Strong 
Gov 
Poor 
Gov Difference
Variable Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Mean Good-Bad 
Cash Holdings 17587 0.1187 0.1646 0.1471 0.0728 0.0743***
G-index 17587 9.0545 2.7601 5.8420 13.0109 -7.169*** 
E-index 17587 2.2746 1.3447 1.0306 3.6213 
-
2.5908***
KZ Index 17587 -3.8991 17.8584 -5.1551 -2.5422 
-
2.6129***
Prob. of Distress 17587 0.3137 0.2863 0.2980 0.3112 
-
0.0133***
Size 17587 7.1672 1.5020 6.8232 7.5417 
-
0.7185***
Cashflow 17587 0.2227 0.6666 0.3009 0.0998 0.2011***
Leverage 17587 0.5677 0.3322 0.5371 0.5980 
-
0.0608***
Q 17587 1.8357 1.4371 1.9911 1.6725 0.3186***
NWC 17587 0.0664 0.3042 0.0707 0.0868 -0.0161 
CAPX 17587 0.0685 0.0597 0.0731 0.0622 0.0110***
ACQ 17587 0.0247 0.0636 0.0238 0.0264 -0.0027 
This table provides summary statistics on key variables of the sample of 17,587 firm-year 
observations (1990-2005). Cash Holdings is computed as cash and marketable securities 
standardized by total assets. G-index and E-index are the governance and entrenchment 
index numbers as tabulated by Gompers et al (2003) and Bebchuck et al. (2005) 
respectively. KZ index, a proxy for financial constraint, is measured following the 
methodology employed by Lamont et al (2001). Probability of distress is measured 
following Ohlson’s (1980) probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy methodology. Size is 
measured as natural log of total assets. Cashflow is measured as income before 
extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization. Leverage is ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets. Q is measured as ratio of market value to book value of assets. 
Net working capital is measured as current assets less of cash and marketable securities 
and current liabilities. Variables Cashflow, Net working capital, Capital expenditures and 
Acquisitions all are standardized by net assets (Total assets minus cash and marketable 
securities) following Opler et al. (1999). The construction of all variables is detailed in 
Table 1. 
 
This table also illustrates differences between both strong and poor governance firms, 
especially in terms of performance as measured by cash flow. A higher number for KZ 
index indicates financially constrained. Table 2 shows that on average poorly governed 
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firms are more financially constrained. Poorly governed firms on average have higher 
leverage and lower growth opportunities and hence lower capital expenditures as 
compared to strong governance firms. Further, it can be observed that both investment in 
net working capital and acquisitions are higher for poorly governed firms, although the 
differences for these two parameters are not statistically significant. 
1.4.2 Univariate Tests  
Table 3 breaks down the cash holdings by year and by governance quality. Using 
the G-index, governance is split up into good, average, and poor governance. Column ‘N’ 
notes the firm count under each category. Consistent with prior evidence such as Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith (2007)6, this table shows cash holdings are increasing over time. During 
the sample time period, cash holdings increase from about 8.6 percent of total assets to 
just over 20 percent of total assets. Firms with strong governance experience an increase 
in cash holdings of about 14 percentage points over the time period, while firms with 
poor governance experience only about an 8 percentage point increase. The difference in 
cash holdings between strong and bad governance firms increases over the sample period 
and peaks in 2002 and 2003. This evidence would not provide support for the classic 
agency argument predicting higher cash holdings for poor governance firms.  
  
                                                 
6 The sample considered in their paper reflects variation in cash holdings as percentage of total assets from 
5% in year 1990 to 13% in 2003. 
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Table 3. Sample Sort: Cash Holdings by Governance Over Time (Using G-Index)   
Year 
Good Gov Avg. Gov Poor Gov Total Diff. 
(Good 
Gov - 
Poor Gov)CH N CH N CH N CH N 
1990 0.1031 339 0.0834 498 0.0633 159 0.0861 997 0.0398 
1991 0.1026 343 0.0848 505 0.0639 181 0.0865 1030 0.0387 
1992 0.1051 326 0.0838 484 0.0625 168 0.0866 979 0.0426 
1993 0.1190 318 0.0961 551 0.0768 224 0.0985 1094 0.0421 
1994 0.1186 306 0.0852 532 0.0646 218 0.0905 1057 0.0540 
1995 0.1147 301 0.0842 551 0.0600 253 0.0869 1106 0.0548 
1996 0.1149 289 0.0885 531 0.0639 242 0.0899 1063 0.0510 
1997 0.1215 271 0.0852 494 0.0626 218 0.0900 983 0.0588 
1998 0.1490 349 0.0950 603 0.0636 259 0.1091 1210 0.0854 
1999 0.1489 316 0.0946 576 0.0591 265 0.1076 1157 0.0898 
2000 0.1416 401 0.1103 567 0.0615 302 0.1110 1271 0.0801 
2001 0.1587 412 0.1246 554 0.0732 326 0.1260 1291 0.0855 
2002 0.2225 382 0.1771 534 0.0865 285 0.1748 1202 0.1360 
2003 0.2298 365 0.1809 684 0.0979 293 0.1801 1342 0.1319 
2004 0.1957 350 0.1894 757 0.1114 290 0.1778 1396 0.0843 
2005 0.2397 103 0.2064 229 0.1417 77 0.2017 409 0.0980 
Total 0.1471 5173 0.1195 9262 0.0728 3762 0.1187 17587 0.0743 
This table breaks down the cash holdings by year over the sample period 1990-2005 as 
shown under the column Total. Further, the cash holdings are also tabulated separately 
for good, average and poor governed firms by each year. The governance measure 
considered here is the Gompers et al (2003) G-Index measure. Firms with G-score of 7 
and below are termed as Good governance firms. Firms with G-score 12 and higher are 
categorized as poorly governed firms. Finally, all the firm with a G-score between 8 and 
11 are termed as firms with average governance.   
 
 Table 4 provides a correlation matrix for all variables to be used in the 
regressions. I find that the correlation coefficient between most of the variables is fairly 
low. We do see as expected a high correlation between the G-index and the E-index. 
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Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
CH Gindex Eindex Size KZ Leverage Q CAPX ACQ Cashflow NWC 
CH 1.0000 
Gindex -0.0721 1.0000 
(0.0000) 
eindex -0.0047 0.7934 1.0000 
(0.5187) 
 
(0.0000) 
Size -0.4370 0.2653 0.0316 1.0000 
(0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
KZ -0.1813 0.0022 0.0253 0.1110 1.0000 
(0.0000 (0.7750) (0.0009) (0.0000) 
Leverage -0.3495 0.0674 0.0178 0.2834 0.1780 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0154) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Q 0.5184 -0.0926 -0.0692 -0.3030 -0.0615 -0.2408 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CAPX 0.0730 -0.0088 -0.0487 -0.0768 0.1012 -0.0174 0.1099 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.2298) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0175) (0.0000) 
ACQ -0.1315 0.0319 0.0716 -0.0983 -0.3210 0.0532 -0.0568 -0.2050 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Cashflow 0.8794 -0.0326 -0.0367 -0.3465 -0.1050 -0.2329 0.3105 0.0498 -0.1125 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
NWC -0.3704 -0.0556 -0.0407 -0.0141 0.0200 -0.2539 -0.1361 -0.0919 0.0117 0.4389 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0546) (0.0083) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1138) (0.0000) 
 
This table shows the correlation matrix between the independent variables used in this paper. G-index and E-index are the governance 
and entrenchment index numbers as tabulated by Gompers et al (2003) and Bebchuck et al. (2005) respectively. Size is measured as 
natural log of total assets. KZ index, a proxy for financial constraint, is measured following the methodology employed by Lamont et 
al (2001). Construction of variables: Cashflow, Q, Leverage, CAPX, ACQ and NWC are detailed in Table 1. P-values in parentheses.
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This is expected as these two measures are created from the same IRRC provisions, 
where the E-index is a subset of the G-index focused on entrenchment provisions. These 
two variables are not used in the same regression in the paper. The two are used only 
independently to show the results are robust to either measurement of governance. In 
order to make certain that multicollinearity is not an issue between independent variables, 
Variance inflation factor (VIF) test was performed. VIF measures the impact of 
collinearity among the independent variables’ in a regression model on the precision of 
estimation. It expresses the degree to which collinearity among the predictors degrades 
the precision of an estimate. Typically a VIF value greater than 10 is of concern. VIF 
tests resulted with a maximum VIF measure 2.64 for leverage and the over-all mean VIF 
was 1.42. 
 Table 5 runs a univariate sort on the sample. Panel A lists the cash holdings over 
the sample period for all differing levels of governance. There is an obvious trend for 
both G-index and E-index where cash holdings decrease as the G-index and E-index 
increase. Increases in the G-index and E-index signify a worsening in firm governance. 
Consistent with the findings of Table 3, firms with better governance hold more cash. 
Panel B of Table 5 sorts cash holdings by additional variables. Also shown in the table is 
a t-test of the difference between the high and low group of each different sort. The first 
sort looks at G-index, which is a recap of table 3 and tests the difference between strong 
and bad governance. The difference is almost 7.5 percentage points and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. E-index has a similar result to G-index.  
 Splitting the sample based on size shows smaller firms hold a higher percentage 
of cash than larger firms. Small firms hold almost 11 percentage points more cash as 
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compared to assets as large firms do. The next factor examined is the financial constraint 
level of firms, as measured by the KZ-index.  
Table 5A: Univariate Test (Cash Holdings vs. Governance Measures) 
Panel A: Cash Holdings  
G-Index   Mean   E-index   Mean 
2 Best Governance 0.2326 0 Best Governance 0.1435 
3 0.1615 1 0.1554 
4 0.1484 2 0.1329 
5 0.1466 3 
Average 
Governance 0.1113 
6 0.1466 4 0.0808 
7 0.1568 5 0.0582 
8 0.1493 6 
Worst 
Governance 0.0997 
9 
Average 
Governance 0.1283
10 0.1163
11 0.0941
12 0.0868
13 0.0640
14 0.0642
15 0.0628
16 0.0549
17 0.1076
18 0.0743
19 
Worst 
Governance 0.0530         
Panel A shows cash holdings based on different levels of governance. G-Index is the 
Gompers et al (2003) score and E-Index is the Bebchuck et al (2005) score. In both cases 
the lower the index number, the better the governance of firms. The means reported here 
are the mean values of cash holdings for firms with respective G and E index numbers. 
Cash holdings are computed as cash and marketable securities standardized by total 
assets. 
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Table 5B: Univariate Test (Cash Holdings vs. Test Variables) 
Panel B: Cash Holdings  
Variable Description Mean   
Difference 
(1-3)   
G-Index 1 Strong Governance 0.1471 
G-Index 2 Average Governance 0.1195 
G-Index 3 Poor Governance 0.0728 0.0743*** 
E-Index 1 Strong Governance 0.1511 
E-Index 2 Average Governance 0.1220 
E-Index 3 Poor Governance 0.0773 0.0738*** 
Size 1 Small 0.1818 
Size 2 Medium 0.1095 
Size 3 Large 0.0742 0.1076*** 
KZ-Index 1 Not Constrained 0.2176 
KZ-Index 2 Average Constrained 0.0979 
KZ-Index 3 Constrained 0.0530 0.1646*** 
Distress 
Dummy: 0 Not Distress 0.1301 
Distress 
Dummy: 1 Distress 0.0948 0.0353*** 
Q 1 Low Q 0.0790 
Q 2 Average Q 0.0933 
Q 3 High Q 0.2042     -0.1252***  
Panel B shows cash holdings based on different levels of governance measures, Size, 
Financial Constraint and Distress status and Growth Opportunities. G-Index and the E-
Index broadly grouped as good, average and poor governance firms respectively. The 
next sets of variables are grouped by size. Size as measured by total assets (adjusted for 
CPI index for 2004 dollars) are sorted and grouped as size 1 (bottom tercile), size 3 (top 
tercile) with size 2 constituting the middle tercile. KZ index scores, computed in 
accordance with Lamont et al (2001) methodology, are also grouped by terciles, the 
smallest of the three labeled as financially unconstrained firms. Probability of distress is 
measured following Ohlson’s (1980) probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy methodology. 
Distress dummy is 1 when Ohlson’s probability of bankruptcy is greater than 0.5. Q 
variable is computed as the ratio of market value of firm to the book value of firm and 
proxy growth opportunities. Q values with less than 1 are firms with low growth 
opportunities, Q values between 1 and 2 as firms with average growth opportunities and 
Q values greater than 2 are firms with greatest growth opportunities. Cash holdings are 
computed as cash and marketable securities standardized by total assets. The last column 
shows difference of means t-test. 
*** indicates significant at 1% confidence level 
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Financially constrained firms hold over 16 percentage points less cash than non-
financially constrained firms. Financially constrained firms find it difficult to access 
financial markets (Whited, 1992; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995) and thus are forced to 
put all of their assets to use and are unable to hold excess levels of cash. Firms considered 
in financial distress have a similar issue with shortage of cash. Investment opportunities 
as measured by Q also impact the level of cash holdings7. Firms with a higher Q or high 
growth opportunities hold around 12.5 percentage points more cash as compared to assets 
than firms with low growth opportunities. This is not surprising as firms with more future 
growth opportunities will hold more cash on hand to quickly and more efficiently take 
advantage of opportunities as they become available. 
 Table 6 examines the industry concentration of the firms in the sample. We 
examine different industries to see if the difference in cash holdings between firms with 
strong and poor governance is concentrated in certain industries. I report in Panel A as 
any industry with at least 250 firm-year observations.  
Table 6 is sorted by the total concentration of the sample by industry. Reported in the 
table are cash holdings for each type of governance as well as the ratio of cash holdings 
of strong governance firms to poor governance firms. I find certain industries have 
greater differences, but only three industries of the reported 20 industries have ratios less 
than one. That is, only 15 percent of the industries with significant concentrations do not 
follow the trend of strong governance firms holding more cash.  
  
                                                 
7  The Q variable is used as a measure of the firm’s future growth opportunities in this paper.  However, Q 
is also sometimes employed as a performance measure.  Thus, to avoid problems with interpretation of Q, 
we also use an alternative measure of growth opportunities in a later section.  
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Table 6A: Cash Holdings by Industry and Governance 
Full Sample Good Gov Bad Gov Good/Bad 
SIC 
Code Industry Con CH Con CH Con CH Ratio 
49 Electric, Gas and 
Sanitary Services 
9.10% 0.0217 7.01% 0.0178 7.68% 0.0198 0.8993 
28 Chemicals and Allied 
Products 
8.10% 0.1707 7.63% 0.2108 9.88% 0.0993 2.1222 
73 Business Services 7.51% 0.2678 9.93% 0.2828 3.26% 0.1160 2.4387 
36 Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment (Ex.  
Computers) 
7.36% 0.2153 9.08% 0.2531 4.97% 0.1431 1.7686 
35 Industry and 
Commercial Machinery 
and Computers 
7.14% 0.1756 7.54% 0.2203 8.03% 0.0768 2.8669 
38 Measuring and 
Analyzing Instruments 
4.86% 0.1583 3.37% 0.1873 5.97% 0.1174 1.5955 
37 Transportation 
Equipment 
3.16% 0.0761 1.97% 0.0812 3.39% 0.0795 1.0211 
20 Food and Kindred 
Products 
3.15% 0.0570 3.83% 0.0749 2.61% 0.0416 1.7977 
48 Communication 2.94% 0.0736 3.81% 0.0952 3.39% 0.0156 6.1050 
13 Oil & Gas Extraction 2.78% 0.0525 2.13% 0.0747 2.04% 0.0349 2.1424 
33 Primary Metal Industries 2.59% 0.0493 2.37% 0.0483 4.13% 0.0436 1.1074 
50 Wholesale Trade - 
Durable Goods 
2.54% 0.0582 2.46% 0.0467 2.88% 0.0542 0.8623 
27 Printing, Publishing & 
Allied Industries 
2.48% 0.0813 1.88% 0.1150 3.37% 0.0359 3.2000 
26 Paper and Allied 
Products 
2.08% 0.0262 1.14% 0.0268 2.74% 0.0225 1.1907 
34 Fabricated Metal 
Products 
2.05% 0.0536 1.25% 0.0825 2.88% 0.0440 1.8737 
60 Depository Institutions 2.03% 0.1158 2.04% 0.1407 1.82% 0.0868 1.6206 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 1.77% 0.0951 3.09% 0.0954 0.62% 0.0487 1.9601 
51 Wholesale Trade – Non 
Durable Goods 
1.52% 0.0594 0.60% 0.1223 2.85% 0.0328 3.7299 
56 Apparel and Accessory 
Stores 
1.49% 0.1745 1.93% 0.1537 2.31% 0.1371 1.1212 
58 Eating and Drinking 
Places 
1.42% 0.0499 1.39% 0.0533 1.57% 0.0564 0.9465 
This table presents cash holdings (standardized by total assets) for firms differentiated by 
industry. Only firms with at least 250 firm-year observations per industry are reported 
here. The column Con represents concentration of firms by industry for the total sample. 
Next, I report cash holdings for good governance firms and poor governance firms again 
segregated by industry. The governance measure used here to is the Gomper, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) G-Index. Similar results were obtained when Bebchuck, Cohen and 
Ferrell (2005) E-Index was used. The last column reports the ratio of cash holdings for 
good over poor governance firms. 
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Table 6B. Cash Holdings by Industry and Growth Opportunities 
Good/Bad 
SIC Code Industry Con Mean-Q Ratio 
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable goods 2.54% 1.393 0.862 
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 9.10% 1.107 0.899 
58 Eating and Drinking Places 1.42% 1.990 0.947 
37 Transportation Equipment 3.16% 1.531 1.021 
33 Primary Metal Industries 2.59% 1.290 1.107 
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 1.49% 2.043 1.121 
26 Paper and Allied Products 2.08% 1.465 1.191 
38 Measuring and Analyzing 
Instruments 
4.86% 2.219 1.596 
60 Depository Institutions 2.03% 1.219 1.621 
36 Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
(Ex. Computers) 
7.36% 2.129 1.769 
20 Food and Kindred Products 3.15% 2.058 1.798 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 2.05% 1.512 1.874 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 1.77% 2.015 1.960 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 8.10% 2.567 2.122 
13 Oil & Gas Extraction 2.78% 1.505 2.142 
73 Business Services 7.51% 2.514 2.439 
35 Industry and Commercial Machinery 
and Computers 
7.14% 1.890 2.867 
27 Printing, Publishing & Allied 
Industries 
2.48% 1.829 3.200 
51 Wholesale Trade – Non Durable 
goods 
1.52% 1.511 3.730 
48 Communication 2.94% 1.760 6.105 
This table reflects cash holdings (standardized by total assets) for firms differentiated by 
industry. Only firms with at least 250 firm-year observations per industry are reported 
here. The column ‘Con’ represents concentration of firms by industry for the total 
sample. Next, I compute the cash holdings for strong governance firms and poor 
governance firms again segregated by industry. The last column reports the ratio of cash 
holdings for strong over poor governance firms. The governance measure used here to is 
the Gomper, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) G-Index. Similar results were obtained when 
Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell (2005) E-Index was used. The results are sorted in 
increasing order of the ratio of cash holdings held by strong governance firms over poor 
governance firms. The corresponding average Q values are reported here for the 
respective industry. 
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In Panel B of Table 6, I further examine this issue by sorting the industries by the 
ratio of cash holdings of strong and poor governance and adding in average Q of the 
industry. The results of the table are consistent with the idea as an industry’s Q increase 
so does the cash holdings ratio. This table is sorted by the ratio, as tabulated in the last 
column.      
1.4.3 Multivariate Tests  
Table 7 illustrates the results from a regression with cash holdings as the 
dependent variable. The regression examines the effects of governance on cash holdings, 
while controlling for several other factors. The base model is as follows: 
 Cash_Holdingsi t = a0 + a1Gi,t + a2KZi,t + a3Sizei,t + a4CashFlowi,t + a5Leveragei,t 
a6Market-to-booki,t + a7NWCi,t +a8Capital Expendituresi,t + a9Aquisitionsi,t + Year 
Dummies + Industry Dummies + ei,t 
 The results of the fixed effects regression confirm the main findings of the 
previous univariate tests in a multivariate setting. The coefficient for G-index in column 
(1) of Table 7 is negative and statistically significant, meaning firms with better 
governance hold a significantly higher percentage of assets in cash. The coefficient for 
KZ-index is also negative and significant. Since increases in KZ mean higher financial 
constraint, the negative relation means firms with lower levels of constraint hold more 
cash. This result lends support to the rational expectation that firms hold more cash when 
they are able to (low financial constraints), and they hold less cash when sources of funds 
are tight (high financial constraints). Size is also negative and significant as smaller firms 
hold a higher percentage of cash per asset. Cash flow is positive and significant as better 
firm performance leads to higher total cash holdings. This variable also helps to control 
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for the documented difference in performance between strong and poor governance 
(Harford, et al. 2008). Leverage is negative and significant, which suggests that the high 
fixed payments associated with high leverage lowers cash holdings. Consistent with the 
univariate findings, the coefficient for Q is positive and significant as firms with better 
opportunities hold a higher percentage of cash. The positive relationship between capital 
expenditures and cash holdings indicates that firms in greater need for capital additions 
hold a greater percentage of cash. The acquisition variable shows a negative and 
significant relationship with cash holdings, indicating that firms engaging in acquisition 
activity hold a lower percentage of cash. This finding is in line with Harford (1999), who 
shows that cash rich firms are more likely to actively pursue active acquisition strategy 
and in the process lower their cash holdings.  The R-squared of this regression is high at 
0.8526.                             
 Column (2) of table 7 adds net working capital to the regression. This variable is 
negative and significant and is in agreement with prior work. Dittmar et al. (2003) show 
similar results and comment that net working capital and cash holdings appear to be 
substitutes. Column (3) of Table 7 uses a dummy variable for strong governance instead 
of using the raw g-index number. This is done to see if we get the same result as was 
conducted in Column (1) when we use a dummy variable instead of the continuous g-
index variable since the results could be influenced by a few firms with really strong or 
poor governance. The result from the dummy variable used to measure strong governance 
is the same as when using the raw g-index in column (1) and supports the results from the 
previous tables. The other variables in this regression do not change significantly. 
Columns (4) and (5) run similar tests but use the e-index instead of the g-index used in 
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the other columns. The results using e-index are the same as those found when using g-
index. As e-index decrease or as managers become less entrenched they hold a higher 
percentage of cash.  
Table 7. Multivariate Tests: Impact of Governance on Cash Holdings 
Dependant Variable: Cash Holding (Cash / TA)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
G-Index -0.0046 -0.0044 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Strong Governance Dummy 0.0313 0.0303 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Poor Governance Dummy -0.0021 -0.0007 
(0.22) (0.70) 
E-index -0.0125 
(0.00) 
KZ-Index -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Size  -0.0046 -0.0044 -0.0066 -0.0066 -0.0054 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cashflow 0.1831 0.1733 0.1863 0.1746 0.1826 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Leverage -0.0637 -0.0972 -0.0595 -0.0994 -0.0607 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Q 0.0211 0.0194 0.0208 0.0189 0.0199 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NWC -0.0576 -0.0701 
(0.00) (0.01) 
CAPEX 0.1141 0.1207 0.1112 0.1156 0.1341 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ACQ -0.1641 -0.1546 -0.1704 -0.1586 -0.1614 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 17587 17587 17587 17587 17587 
R-squared Overall 0.8526 0.8525 0.7656 0.7418 0.8486 
This table shows the regression of the dependant variable: Cash Holdings (Cash / TA) on 
governance measures G-index in model (1) and (2). Model (3) and (4) use strong and 
poor governance dummy by G-Index and E-Index respectively. Size, Leverage, Cash 
flow, Q, Net working capital, capital expenditures, Acquisitions, the financial constraint 
measure KZ index are being used as control variables in this regression. The construction 
of these variables is detailed in Table 1. 2-digit SIC codes are used as industry dummy. 
Finally the year dummies were also considered in order to control for fluctuations on 
account of passage of time. Model (5) uses E-index in place of G-index. P-values are 
shown in parentheses. 
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 Both measures of governance lead to the same result, with strong governance 
positively related to cash holdings. These findings suggest that agency problems are not 
the driving force behind the higher cash holdings in recent years. After finding this result, 
the big question that arises is why do firms with better governance hold a higher 
percentage of their assets in cash. We address this question next.  
Table 8 examines the question of governance and cash holdings with a two-way 
sort of governance and other key variables used in the regression. The results with size 
and governance illustrate small firms with strong governance hold the highest cash as a 
percentage of assets, while large poor governance firms hold the least cash. The next sort 
examines governance with Q and finds the highest level of cash holdings for firms with 
strong governance and high Q or high growth opportunities. This makes sense as firms 
with greater opportunities may want to hold higher levels of cash to take better advantage 
of future opportunities.  
The next sort examines governance and the KZ-index. Firms with strong 
governance and low financial constraint hold the highest percentage of cash, suggesting 
that these firms may hold more cash when they are financially able to, perhaps building 
up slack for weaker times. The difference between firms with strong and weak 
governance is negligible when firms in both the groups are financially constrained. These 
findings suggest that firms with strong governance build up cash when available, but poor 
governance firms do not build up as much cash even when they are not financially 
constrained. Finally, I observe higher cash holdings for firms that are not in distress as 
compared to firms in distress. Panel B uses e-index as a measure for governance with a 
similar result.  
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Table 8A. Cash Holdings and Governance Using G Index – Double Sort 
Panel A:  G-Index is used to calculate good, average, and poor governance 
Good  Average Poor Difference (Good - Poor) 
Large Size 0.0944 0.0761 0.0544 0.0400** 
Medium Size 0.1194 0.1176 0.0734 0.0460** 
Small Size 0.2079 0.1789 0.1130 0.0949*** 
Good  Average Poor Difference 
Low Q 0.0900 0.0796 0.0530 0.0369** 
Avg Q 0.1182 0.0962 0.0573 0.0610** 
High Q 0.2353 0.2056 0.1310 0.1043*** 
Good  Average Poor Difference 
KZ1 (Con) 0.0604 0.0520 0.0410 0.0195** 
KZ2 (Avg) 0.1285 0.0978 0.0617 0.0669** 
KZ3 (Not Con) 0.2696 0.2250 0.1147 0.1549*** 
Good  Average Poor Difference 
Distressed 0.1146 0.0953 0.0602 0.0544** 
Not Distress 0.1629 0.1318 0.0770 0.0859** 
Panel A of this table reflects the univariate test of the key variable – the cash holdings 
against the governance measures G-Index broadly grouped as good, average and poor 
governance firms respectively. G-Index is the Gompers et al (2003) score used as a proxy 
for governance measure of firms in this paper. The next sets of variables are grouped by 
size. Total assets adjusted for CPI index for 2004 dollars are sorted and the smallest 
tercile grouped as small firms and so on. KZ index scores, computed in accordance with 
Lamont et al (2001) methodology, are also grouped by terciles, the smallest of the three 
labeled as financially unconstrained firms. Probability of distress is measured following 
Ohlson’s (1980) probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy methodology. Distress dummy is 
1 when Ohlson’s probability of bankruptcy is greater than 0.5. Q variable is computed as 
the ratio of market value of firm to the book value of firm and proxy growth 
opportunities. Q values with less than 1 are firms with low growth opportunities, Q 
values between 1 and 2 as firms with average growth opportunities and Q values greater 
than 2 are firms with greatest growth opportunities. Cash holdings are computed as cash 
and marketable securities standardized by total assets. The last column shows difference 
of means t-test. 
*** indicates significant at 1% confidence level 
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Table 8B. Cash Holdings and Governance Using E Index – Double Sort 
 
Panel B: E-Index is used to calculate good, average, and poor governance 
 
Good Average Poor Difference 
Large Size 0.0974 0.0732 0.0490 0.0485*** 
Medium Size 0.1299 0.1132 0.0718 0.0581*** 
Small Size 0.2134 0.1783 0.1261 0.0873*** 
Good Average Poor Difference 
Low Q 0.0851 0.0831 0.0587 0.0264** 
Avg Q 0.1128 0.0962 0.0648 0.0480** 
High Q 0.2408 0.1957 0.1375 0.1033*** 
Good Average Poor Difference 
KZ1 (Con) 0.0605 0.0539 0.0399 0.0207** 
KZ2 (Avg) 0.1227 0.0981 0.0669 0.0558*** 
KZ3 (not Con) 0.2548 0.2195 0.1379 0.1168*** 
Good  Average Poor Difference 
Distressed 0.1143 0.0996 0.0572 0.0571*** 
Not Distressed 0.1615 0.1290 0.0840 0.0775*** 
Panel B of this table reflects the univariate test of the key variable – the cash holdings 
against the governance measure E-Index broadly grouped as good, average and poor 
governance firms respectively. E-Index is the Bebchuck et al (2005) score, being used as 
a proxy for governance measure of firms in this paper. The next sets of variables are 
grouped by size. Total assets adjusted for CPI index for 2004 dollars are sorted and the 
smallest tercile grouped as small firms and so on. KZ index scores, computed in 
accordance with Lamont et al (2001) methodology, are also grouped by terciles, the 
smallest of the three labeled as financially unconstrained firms. Probability of distress is 
measured following Ohlson’s (1980) probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy methodology. 
Distress dummy is 1 when Ohlson’s probability of bankruptcy is greater than 0.5. Q 
variable is computed as the ratio of market value of firm to the book value of firm and 
proxy growth opportunities. Q values with less than 1 are firms with low growth 
opportunities, Q values between 1 and 2 as firms with average growth opportunities and 
Q values greater than 2 are firms with greatest growth opportunities. Cash holdings are 
computed as cash and marketable securities standardized by total assets. The last column 
shows difference of means t-test. 
*** indicates significant at 1% confidence level 
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It appears that firms with strong governance hold higher levels of cash as growth 
opportunities increase. My proposal is strong governance firms will increase holdings 
when advised to do so. One of the times when firms could be benefited from higher cash 
holdings is when they have strong growth opportunities. Table 9 takes a deeper look into 
this notion. Column (1) of table 9 examines the sample of firms with high levels of Q as 
measured with a Q above 2. Column (2) and column (3) examine the sample of firms 
with average Q (Q values between 1 and 2) and low Q (Q values less than 1) respectively. 
The examination of each sample illustrates the magnitude of g-index decreases when 
moving from high Q to low Q. In column (3), which examines only low Q firms, the g-
index is insignificant. That is, governance is not significantly related to cash holdings 
when examining firms with limited growth opportunities.  
This story is consistent with the idea of firms with strong governance holding 
more cash when appropriate or when it is in shareholders’ best interest. Column (4) 
examines the whole sample and uses a dummy for both strong governance and high Q. It 
also includes an interaction variable of high Q and strong governance. All three variables 
are positive and significant. Strong governance, high Q, and the combination of the two 
all increase cash holdings. The strong governance dummy variable is significant but 
lower in magnitude as compared to Table (7) where the interaction term is not used. This 
would appear to be consistent with the idea of one viable reason for strong governance 
firms to hold more cash. They hold higher level of cash when these firms have stronger 
growth opportunities and do so more than other firms with weaker governance. This in 
depth analysis of the role of growth opportunities to firm cash holdings adds to the results 
shown in Harford et al. (2008) paper.   
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Table 9. Multivariate Tests: Sample Differentiated by Growth Opportunities 
Dependant Variable: Cash Holding (Cash / TA) 
Sample High Q Avg Q Low Q Full Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
G-Index -0.0216 -0.0067 -0.0002 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.46) 
Strong Governance Dummy 0.0365 
(0.00) 
Poor Governance Dummy -0.0034 
(0.05) 
KZ-Index -0.0044 -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0006 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Size -0.0194 -0.0102 -0.0237 -0.0040 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cashflow 0.2185 0.1413 0.1351 0.1714 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Leverage -0.1324 -0.1307 -0.1065 -0.1270 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Q 0.0170 0.0731 0.0457 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.22) 
High Q Dummy 0.0385 
(0.00) 
Low Q Dummy -0.0211 
(0.00) 
Strong Governance Dummy * Q 0.0008 
(0.10) 
NWC -0.0811 -0.1128 -0.0735 -0.0734 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPEX 0.1905 0.1401 0.3742 0.1366 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
ACQ -0.5599 -0.0986 -0.0208 -0.1678 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) 
 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 4558 10266 2763 17587 
R-squared Overall 0.7921 0.7598 0.2349 0.8300 
This table shows the regression of the dependant Variable: Cash Holding (Cash/TA) on 
governance measure G-index, constraint measure KZ index, and other control variables – 
Size (log of total assets), cash flow, Q, Leverage, NWC, CAPEX and ACQ. 2-digit SIC 
codes are used as industry dummy. Finally the year dummies were also considered in 
order to control for fluctuations on account of passage of time. The sample of 
independent variables is restricted in sample size by grouping firms in brackets of High 
Q, Average Q and Low Q. The last column reflects the results of using full sample. High 
Q, Low Q dummy variables and an interaction variable of strong governance dummy 
with Q is included in this model. 
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In this paper I agree with Harford et al. results that firms with better governance 
and better growth opportunities hold higher levels of cash holdings, but I further extend 
my study to show that only well-governed firms with better growth opportunities hold 
significantly higher levels of cash holdings. Well governed firms with low growth 
opportunities do not significantly differ in their cash holdings when compared to poorly-
governed firms with low growth opportunities. 
Another reason for holding additional cash is financial slack. It may help firms to 
hold additional cash as it may help them avoid financial constraints and even financial 
distress. To test this notion I examine if firm governance is negatively related to financial 
constraint status of firms. Table 10 examines this issue. Column (1) examines the sample 
of firms considered financially unconstrained by the KZ-index measure. For firms 
considered financially unconstrained, governance as measured by the g-index is negative 
and significant. That is, financially unconstrained firms with better governance hold more 
cash than unconstrained firms with poor governance. In contrast, as shown in column (2), 
governance does not affect the level of cash holdings when firms are financially 
constrained. This finding suggests that strong governance firms hold cash when available 
(i.e., when financially unconstrained). Columns (3) and (4) examine firms with strong 
governance and poor governance. Cash holdings for firms with strong governance are 
significantly influenced by the KZ-index and level of Q, while firms with poor 
governance are unaffected by the KZ-index and influenced by Q at a much smaller 
margin. The results of this table are consistent with the idea of firms with strong 
governance holding more cash with increasing growth opportunities (as measured by Q) 
and  decreasing financial constraint (as measured by the KZ-index). The other interesting 
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insight in this table is that poorly governed firms choose to hold lower levels of cash 
holdings and do not plan for contingencies of constraint or growth opportunities’ 
conditions.  
Table 10. Multivariate Tests: Sample Differentiated by Financial Status and Governance 
Dependant Variable: Cash Holding (Cash / TA) 
Sample 
Non-
Constrained Constrained Good Gov Poor Gov 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
G-Index -0.0118 -0.0010 
(0.00) (0.19) 
KZ-Index -0.0078 0.0000 
(0.00) (0.84) 
Size -0.0104 -0.0001 -0.0061 -0.0047 
(0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cashflow 0.1446 0.5811 0.1793 0.4641 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Leverage -0.0768 -0.0016 -0.1078 -0.1252 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Q 0.0115 0.0059 0.0183 0.0015 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NWC -0.0445 0.0407 -0.0992 0.0117 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPEX 0.2742 0.0402 0.0942 -0.0644 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ACQ -0.2221 -0.0473 -0.0769 -0.0018 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.28) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 5509 6153 5451 3457 
R-squared Overall 0.8450 0.9481 0.7416 0.6738 
This table shows the regression of the dependant Variable: Cash Holding (Cash/TA) on 
governance measure G-index, constraint measure KZ index, and other control variables – 
Size (log of total assets), cash flow, Q, Leverage, NWC, CAPEX and ACQ. The 
construction of these variables is detailed in Table 1. 2-digit SIC codes are used as 
industry dummy. Finally the year dummies were also considered in order to control for 
fluctuations on account of passage of time. The sample of independent variables is 
restricted in sample size by grouping firms in brackets of Constraint, Non-Constraint, 
Good governance and Poor governance firms using KZ Governance dummy respectively.  
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Harford at al. (2008) paper do not study the role of financial constraints when 
analyzing the firm cash holdings in presence of firm governance. The results that the 
higher cash holdings for financially unconstrained firms as against financially constraint 
firms is true only when firms are well governed, is significant addition to existing 
literature. The other variables under column (4) of this table show that poorly governed 
firms lower the level of cash holdings when faced with choices of additional capital 
expenditures, acquisitions and in paying off some of the debt from its balance sheet.  
Table 11 tests the robustness of the results from the early tables, looking to see if 
the results are influenced by differing time periods of the sample or by industry affects. I 
examine time affects and industry affects as the results from tables 3 and 5 indicate 
variation in time and in industries.  Column (1) of table 11 examines the time period from 
1990—1997. This regression illustrates governance was a significant during the time 
period but to a lesser degree than shown in table 7. Column (2) of table 11 examines the 
period from 1998-2005. This regression demonstrates a similar relation with governance 
but the magnitude is over double in size. The results from the time period analysis 
indicate governance has become more significant in terms of determining cash holding of 
firms. In column (3) of table 11, I conduct regressions using fixed effects for industry (3). 
I find the use of fixed effects for industry does not significantly change the results 
reported from table 7. The results of this table indicate time period and industry does not 
change the relation between governance and cash holdings.  
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Table 11. Robustness Tests – Time and Industry Variation 
Dep. Var: CH 1990-1997 1998-2005 Fixed Industry Macro_Adj Ind_Adj_ch 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
G-Index -0.0015 -0.0032 -0.0075 -0.0019 -0.0039 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.000 (0.000) 
KZ-Index -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0001 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.000 (0.079) 
Size -0.0053 -0.0031 -0.0035 -0.0013 -0.0106 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.000 (0.000) 
Cashflow 0.2884 0.1631 0.1658 0.2693 0.1031 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.000 (0.000) 
Leverage -0.0269 -0.0187 -0.1139 -0.0431 -0.0058 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.000 (0.000) 
Q 0.0136 0.0164 0.0204 0.0057 0.0059 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.000 (0.000) 
NWC -0.0188 -0.0233 -0.0335 -0.0598 -0.0018 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.000 (0.000) 
CAPEX 0.1078 0.0896 0.2504 -0.0439 0.1044 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.000 (0.000) 
ACQ -0.0367 -0.0930 -0.1447 -0.0795 -0.0017 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 0.000 (0.000) 
GDP_Gr_Dummy -0.0057  
0.000  
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes No No 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes No Yes No 
  
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
Number of Obs. 8309 9278 17587 17587  17587 
R-squared Overall 0.9633 0.7582 0.8448 0.4523 0.3031 
This table shows the regression of the dependant variable Cash Holdings on governance 
measure G-index, constraint measure KZ index, and other control variables – Size, Cash 
Flow, Q, Leverage, NWC, CAPEX and ACQ. The construction of these variables is 
detailed in Table 1. 2-digit SIC codes are used as industry dummy in models (1), (2) and 
(3). The year dummies were considered in order to control for fluctuations on account of 
passage of time in models (1) and (2).  Model (1) considers firm-years 1990-1997 and 
model (2) reflects results when 1998-2005 firm-years were considered. Model (3) 
controls for fixed industry effects. Model (4) controls for time variation by using GDP 
growth factor. Model (5) reflects regression results for firm-years by controlling for 
industry with mean adjusted values for cash holdings in place of 2-digit SIC dummy.   
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In model (4) I replace the year dummies with a variable that reflects the 
macroeconomic condition over the sample period. I consider the GDP growth for every 
year in the sample period and construct a dummy variable where in the value 1 captures 
above average growth in GDP and 0 value implies below average growth. Over the 
sample period the average GDP comes out to 2.96%. Based on the construct of the 
dummy variable explained above I observe the GDP growth higher than the average for 
years 1992, 1994, 1996-2000, 2004, and 2005 and vice-versa for the rest of the years.  All 
the results of model (4) regression are consistent with earlier findings. The GDP growth 
dummy variable is negative and significant meaning that firms decrease cash holdings in 
years when US economy does better than average. In model (5) the primary regression is 
run with industry adjusted CH as the dependent variable. The results of this regression 
agree with the model (3) results. Next, I address the issue if any, with using Q as my 
proxy for growth opportunities. Since Tobin’s q has been used as a proxy in studies of the 
relationship between insider ownership and market-based performance, I construct 
another proxy variable for growth opportunities in place of Q and test for robustness of 
my primary tests. I use the ratio of R&D to total assets as my proxy for growth 
opportunities. The results are provided in Table 12. All the results of my earlier 
regression stand even with the new proxy variable for growth opportunities.  
The final robustness test for this study is carried out in two separate regressions 
with two different dependent variables but by including lags of key independent 
variables. The lag independent variables tested here over the two separate regressions 
include the governance measure Gt-1, the cash holding variable CHt-1, the interaction 
between the lag cash holding variable and the good governance lag variable(for Panel A 
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shown in Table 13) and the lag of constraint measure KZt-1 as shown in Panel B of Table 
13. In the first regression the dependent variable considered is the financial constraint 
measure, the KZ index.  
Table 12. Robustness Tests: Using R&D / Total Assets as a Proxy Measure for the 
Growth opportunities in place of Q 
 
Dependant Variable: Cash Holding (Cash / TA)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
G-Index -0.0002 -0.0004 
(0.05) (0.02) 
Strong Governance Dummy -0.0067 -0.0017 
(0.00) (0.433) 
Poor Governance Dummy -0.0014 -0.0118 
(0.66) (0.00) 
E-index -0.0163 
(0.00) 
KZ-Index -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0007 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Size  -0.0059 -0.0038 -0.0055 -0.0043 -0.0071 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cash flow 0.1553 0.1337 0.1542 0.1341 0.1584 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Leverage -0.0999 -0.2367 -0.0991 -0.2391 -0.0947 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
R&D/TA 0.6333 0. 5066 0.6469 0.5253 0.5631 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NWC -0.1317 -0.1346 
(0.00) (0.03) 
CAPEX 0.1281 0.1348 0.1328 0.1255 0.1298 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ACQ 0.0461 0.0021 0.0448 0.0006 0.0590 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.95) (0.00) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 8551 8551 8551 8551 8551 
R-squared Overall 0.8771 0.8680 0.8778 0.8703 0.8630 
This table shows the regression of the dependant variable: Cash Holdings (Cash / TA) on 
governance measures G-index in model (1) and (2). Model (3) and (4) use strong and 
poor governance dummy by G-Index. Size, Leverage, Cash flow, Net working capital, 
capital expenditures, Acquisitions, the financial constraint measure KZ index are being 
used as control variables in this regression. R&D/Total Assets is used as a proxy measure 
for growth opportunities in place of Q – used in all the earlier tests. The construction of 
these variables is detailed in Table 1. 2-digit SIC codes are used as industry dummy. 
Finally the year dummies were also considered in order to control for fluctuations on 
account of passage of time. Model (5) uses E-index in place of G-index. P-values are 
shown in parentheses. 
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Table 13. Robustness Tests: Testing with Lag Variables 
 
Panel A Panel B  
Dependant 
Variable   
 
:KZ 
: Cash 
holdings 
 
Gt-1 0.880 -0.0012  
(0.000) (0.001)  
CHt-1 -22.662 0.4465  
(0.000) (0.000)  
CHt-1*Good_Gt-1 -7.190  
(0.006)  
KZt-1 -0.00004  
(0.003)  
Size -2.333 -0.0012  
(0.000) (0.000)  
Leverage 6.451 -0.024  
(0.002) (0.000)  
Cash flow -16.906 0.1134  
(0.000) (0.010)  
Q -0.047 0.0353  
(0.855) (0.000)  
NWC -3.769 -0.054  
(0.000) (0.000)  
CAPEX 7.077 0.0961  
(0.248) (0.000)  
ACQ -1.417 -0.1486  
(0.705) (0.000)  
Constant yes yes  
Number of Obs. 14689 14074  
 
R-Squared Overall 0.080 0.8149  
Panel A of this table shows the regression of the dependent variable KZ index on 1-
period lag variables: G-index, Cash holdings, and KZ index and the interaction variable 
of KZ index and cash holdings in lag form. Size, Leverage, Q, Cash flow, Net working 
capital, capital expenditures, and Acquisitions, are being used as control variables in this 
regression. P-values are shown in parentheses. 
Panel B of this table shows the regression of the dependant variable: Cash Holdings 
(Cash / TA) on 1-period lag variables: cash holdings, governance measure G-index, and 
the financial constraint measure KZ index. Size, Leverage, Q, Cash flow, Net working 
capital, capital expenditures, and Acquisitions, are being used as control variables in this 
regression. This regression closely emulates Harford, et al.  (2008) test. P-values are 
shown in parentheses. 
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The results in Panel A of table 13 indicate that with increase in G index (higher 
number implying poor governance), the KZ index increases (higher KZ index number 
implies constrained firm). In other words, well governed firms in the current time period 
tend to be less financially constrained in the next period.  The lag of cash holding 
variable has a large and significant negative coefficient. This result implies that increase 
in cash holdings in the current time period significantly decreases the likelihood of firm 
being financially constrained in the next time period. This result is in agreement with the 
earlier results shown, and that financially unconstrained firms tend to have higher levels 
of cash holdings.  
The next test variable is the interaction of the lags of cash holdings and good 
governance variables. The coefficient is negative and significant at 6% level. This 
significant negative coefficient for the interaction term suggests that well-governed firms 
with higher cash holdings are less likely to get into financial trouble in the subsequent 
period. These results in combination with Table 10 results adds to the significant 
understanding of the role of financial constraints and governance plays in defining the 
nature of firm cash holdings.  Next, as expected – larger firms, firms with increased cash 
flow and firms with increased net working capital expenditures (negative and significant 
coefficient) are less financially constrained while firms with more leverage (positive and 
significant coefficient) are more financially constrained.  
 In the panel B of Table 13 the regression shown is similar to the Harford et al 
(2008) regression. The dependent variable here is the cash holdings and the key test 
variables including itself (cash holdings) are in lag form. The results of this paper are 
consistent with the results shown in the Harford, et al paper. A negative and significant 
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coefficient variable for the lag G Index implies that poorly governed firms in the prior 
time period tend to hold lower level of cash holdings in the following time period. Firms 
that hold higher level of cash holdings and those that are less financially constrained in 
the lag period and firms with positive growth opportunities tend to hold higher level of 
cash holdings in the following period. These results agree with  the prior findings of this 
paper showing that well governed firms, less financially constrained firms, and firms that 
have better growth opportunities tend to hold higher level of cash holdings.  
1. 5 Conclusions 
In the presence of capital market imperfections deriving from asymmetric 
information between managers and capital providers, liquidity can take on a strategic 
role. The first interesting result that I find in this paper is firms with strong governance 
tend to hold higher level of cash holdings as compared to poorly governed firms. It 
appears strong governance firms are able to mitigate agency issues associated with 
holding cash and lower the marginal costs of holding cash, thus increasing the value of 
holding cash. The reason for strong governance firms holding more cash is consistent 
with two benefits of holding cash. One reason for firms with strong governance to hold 
more cash is when the firm has strong growth opportunities. Holding additional cash 
provides the firms better opportunities to take advantage of investment opportunities as 
they arise.  
Firms with strong governance are also selective in increasing their cash holdings 
as firms with limited growth opportunities do not hold higher levels of cash. Another 
reason for firms with strong governance to hold more cash is to provide financial slack to 
avoid distress during downturns. Firms with strong governance hold more cash when 
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financial constraints are low and cash is available. In contrast, poorly governed firms are 
indifferent to the financial condition of the firm with respect to its level of cash holdings 
and hold lower levels of cash in either scenario.  
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Essay 2 
Do Management Decisions Matter When Firms Are In Distress? 
2.1 Introduction 
One aspect of economic theory argues that competitive markets in transition to 
long-run equilibrium eliminate inefficient firms through the process of bankruptcy and 
liquidation. James (1995), Hotchkiss (1995), and Kahl (2002) argue that reorganization of 
firms after bankruptcy filings is pointless, as these firms are simply delaying an inevitable 
corporate death. Furthermore, White (1989) argues that managers voluntarily choose to 
keep the firm going instead of liquidating as a self-interested preservation of their own 
jobs. This evidence seems to paint a dim picture of a firm’s ability to eventually work 
itself out of bankruptcy. In the twelve month period ended December 31, 2007, there 
were 28,322 businesses that filed for bankruptcy, according to the U.S. federal court 
data8. As alarming as those numbers are, they are small in comparison to the number of 
firms that are in distress each year.  
Previous researchers have attributed manager ineffectiveness, poor timing, and 
lack of contingency planning (Hambrick and Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; Schendel, 
Patton and Riggs, 1976) as the leading indicators in the decline of corporate performance 
leading to financial distress. Several authors have pointed to different areas of the 
                                                 
8 Of these 28,322 businesses, 78 were publicly trading firms. The five largest bankruptcy filings from this 
list are real estate / mortgage-related financial companies. Further, the largest filing of 2007 (New Century 
Financial – Pre-petition assets: $26 billion) made it into the 10 largest bankruptcies of all time.  
Source: BankruptcyData.com, a division of New Generation Research, Inc., 
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business that may increase firm performance while under distress9. Financial distress is 
typically a precursor to bankruptcy as many financially distressed firms appear on future 
years’ list of bankrupt firms. Given the grim picture of bankruptcy, is financial distress 
any different? Are managerial decisions during distress effective in improving the firm's 
prospects? Anecdotal evidence shows that many well-known, financially strong firms 
have at one time been in severe financial distress10. Thus, even with the aforementioned 
dark view of a firm’s ability to re-establish itself, many managers manage to pull their 
firms out of financial distress each year.  
 In this paper, I look to examine if a firm’s success in leaving distress is explained 
by firm characteristics and manager decisions. I primarily focus on two questions: how 
do some firms find their way out of distress while others do not, and what impact do 
managers’ decisions have on distress? To answers these questions, I examine the 
characteristics and manager financing and investing decisions that lead firms out of 
distress and back to financial stability. 
To define manager investing and financing decisions affecting firms’ distress 
status, I start with the bankruptcy model as defined by Beaver (1966). “The firm is 
viewed as a reservoir of liquid assets, which is supplied by inflows and drained by out 
flows. The reservoir serves as a cushion or buffer against variations in the flows. The 
solvency of the firm can be defined in terms of the probability that the reservoir will be 
exhausted at which point the firm will be unable to pay its obligations as they mature (i.e. 
                                                 
9 Some of the many are (Bibeault 1982), operational restructuring (Kang and Shivdasani, 1997), asset 
restructuring on the lines of management buyouts (MBOs) (Kaplan, 1989), asset divestment (Kang and 
Shivdasani, 1997), asset investment (Bhagat, Moyen and Suh, 2005), acquisitions (Grinyer, Mayes and 
McKiernan, 1988), and financial restructuring (Slatter, 1984; John, Lang, and Netter 1992) 
10 Xerox Corporation and Eastman Kodak are couple of notable examples. A more detailed discussion is 
given later. 
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failure)”. Both the current ‘type’ and ‘timing’ of inflows and outflows are largely 
influenced by the management’s prior time-period decisions. This being the case, then the 
current decisions of managers will influence the nature of future cash flows. I analyze 
managers’ decisions ex ante to study what type of decisions help distressed firms to come 
out of financial distress.  
The importance of manager actions under distress is not a brand new idea. 
Support for diverse management actions when in distress is found in Ofek (1993). Ofek 
explores the various responses of a firm in distress regarding both its operational and 
financial conditions, and analyzes why some distressed firms choose certain responses 
over others. Thus, they look at different management choices but not the success of the 
choice. Bhagat, Moyen, and Suh (2005) analyze both healthy and distressed firms. They 
focus on the investment policy for these two groups, and find a significant number of 
financially distressed firms have negative cash flow sensitivity. These findings suggest 
that managers of firms in distress invest more than they did in the prior year. However, 
their study does not examine how these actions influence whether or not distressed firms 
are able to get out of financial distress. Kane and Richardson (2002) show that firms that 
are more likely to get out of distress opt to reduce the size of their property, plant, and 
equipment. I extend this study further by analyzing other changes managers make to 
increase the probability of getting out of the state of financial distress.   
To accomplish this goal, I first compile a sample of distressed firms. From the 
sample of distressed firms, I differentiate the financial status of a firm into two different 
state variables (State 1: Not distressed; and State 2: Distressed) in the future. Following 
Bhagat, Moyen and Suh (2005), I use Ohlson’s (1980) probabilistic prediction of 
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bankruptcy measure to distinguish between the above two mentioned states. Through this 
analysis, I can identify if firm characteristics and management decisions play a role in 
firms’ exiting financial distress, or if, similar to the results for firms reorganizing after 
bankruptcy, the managers have no real impact on distress status.  
The results show firm characteristics are important in determining the future 
financial state of the firm. Size, leverage, and income at the time a firm enters financial 
distress are significant in determining if firms are able to exit distress. More specifically, 
larger firms with less leverage and higher income at the time they enter distress have a 
better chance of exiting distress within a three year period. The results on managers’ 
decisions show managers who increase their investment in product refinement by 
significantly increasing the research and development expenditures help firms to get out 
of distress. I further explore the role of increase in research and development investment 
in helping firms successfully turnaround. I find that the increase in R&D helps firms with 
average and low growth opportunities. For firms with high growth opportunities simple 
increase in R&D investment does not help firms to exit distress. I infer from this result 
that distress for high growth firms has less to do with its own product as compared to 
other factors discussed in literature that cause distress. Firms with average and low 
growth opportunities are usually found in well established industries and they have a 
higher leverage to communicate the changes to the product thus positively impacting 
future cash flows and hence exit distress.  Working capital investment is not significantly 
related to the future financial state of the firm. In support of Kane and Richardson (2002), 
the findings also show that firms lowering their level of capital expenditures are more 
likely to exit distress. This evidence is consistent with the argument that cost cutting and 
 53 
trimming firm operations to provide additional funds for research and development can 
contribute significantly towards a successful turnaround. The results also show the 
inability of changes in financing choices to move a firm out of distress. Firms selling 
common or preferred stock to raise money, as also shown in Bhagat et al. (2005), does 
not increase the likelihood of firms’ exiting distress.  
So, why does it matter which firms make it out of distress? In addition to the 
intuitive answer, the importance of leaving financial distress can be explained in more 
than one way. As far as the indirect costs of bankruptcy are concerned, the costs keep 
increasing as a firm sinks deeper into distress and results in the loss of reputation and 
potential drop in sales due to poor financial performance. I focus on shareholders’ 
primary concern, stock returns. As expected, the returns for the sample of firms 
remaining in distress are significantly lower than those successfully exiting distress 
during the three year period. Firms leaving distress have three-year holding period returns 
around 37 percent points higher than their counterparts unable to make it out of distress.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II highlights issues of 
the macroeconomic conditions from the recent past in regards to firms experiencing 
performance decline and their attempts at turnaround. Section III details the relevant 
literature leading up to this study. Section IV presents a discussion of the Ohlson’s 
measure used for distinguishing the distressed versus non distressed samples. Section V 
offers information on data collection and further identifies the control and the test 
variables used in the study. Section VI presents a discussion of results and Section VII 
concludes.   
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2.2  Background: Firms Exiting Financial Distress  
Many firms find their way out distress by making key corporate decisions. 
Schefenacker, which makes mirrors for carmakers such as BMW and Mercedes, when 
faced with serious financial distress in late 2006, emerged from a tortuous restructuring, 
moved their headquarters, downsized its debt by 47%, and its founder gave up three-
quarters of his shares to creditors. Downsizing of workforce (General Motors); 
restructuring of capital structure (Meridian); asset sale (Ford); and change in top 
management (Citigroup, Merrill Lynch) are a few recent examples of how managements 
of different firms have reacted to performance declines.  The related literature has so far 
focused on three forms of exit strategies for distressed firms – resolution through 
bankruptcy filing, voluntary liquidation, and merger and acquisition. These exit strategies 
invariably result in losses for the stockholders of the firm. White (1983) emphasizes how 
equity holders always favor continuance since their interest is eliminated if liquidation is 
chosen. Hence, a sizable number of distressed firms choose alternative strategies to 
combat distress and continue to keep the owner’s control over the firm.  This paper 
analyzes the strategies employed by firm management that have preserved and helped 
grow shareholder’s wealth after the financial distress phase.  
2.3 Literature Review 
The supporting literature for this paper can be categorized into three distinct 
themes. The first is the financial distress literature which has focused largely on 
explaining11 and measuring the costs of distress12. The next significant research area tied 
                                                 
11 Direct Costs: From the capital structure perspective significant costs on account of financial distress for 
stockholders in the form of legal and administrative costs of restructuring the firm’s debt.  
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to this paper addresses topics such as turnaround and recovery in the face of declining 
performance. Turnaround is closely associated with management strategy, as researchers 
explored various mechanisms employed by managers attempting turnarounds.  
2.3.1 Financial Distress 
Altman (1983) introduces corporate distress by including with it the legal process 
of corporate bankruptcy reorganization and liquidation and describes it as “a sobering 
economic reality reflecting the uniqueness of the American way of corporate death.” In 
contrast, Wruck (1990) states categorically that “financial distress – is not synonymous 
with corporate death.” She finds that firms in financial distress face a variety of situations 
having very different effects on their values and claimholders. This diversity in 
conjunction with conflicts of interest among claimholders, leads to an information 
problem that makes valuing a distressed firm difficult. Interestingly, Wruck (1990) 
identifies the ‘upsides’ associated with financial distress. She states that financial distress 
is often accompanied by comprehensive organizational changes in management, 
governance and structure. This organizational restructuring can create value by 
improving the use of resources. Financial distress frees resources to move to higher-
valued uses by forcing managers and directors to reduce capacity and to rethink operating 
policies and strategy decisions. This kind of organizational change is unlikely to occur in 
an all-equity firm, because without leverage, poor performance does not lead to financial 
distress. It is financial distress that gives creditors a legal right to demand restructuring. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Indirect costs: The opportunity loss suffered when corporate resources are diverted to debt restructuring 
process from more productive uses (reviewed by Myers (1984) and Masulis (1988)) 
Managerial financial distress costs: Gilson (1989) shows that 52% of all sampled firms experience a senior-
level management change during the period of financial distress 
12 Warner (1977) measures the direct costs as result of bankruptcy; Ang et al (1982) attempt to measure the 
administrative costs as a result of Bankruptcy. 
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Kaplan (1989) analyzes financially distressed firms that subsequently complete 
management buyouts over the period from 1985 through 1989. They find a higher 
incidence of default on their debt ex-post the buyout decision. Denis and Denis (1995) 
analyze the causes and resolutions of financially distressed firms by examining a sample 
of 29 leveraged recapitalizations completed between 1985 and 1988. Interestingly they do 
not find a higher rate of asset sales among the distressed firms and, when asset sales do 
occur, the market participants treat this news as a negative signal.   
2.3.2 Management Strategy 
Bracker (1980) reviews the historical development of the strategic management 
concept and discusses the many definitions of strategy offered by various researchers13, 
as related to the business world. He states that “The major importance of strategic 
management is that it gives organizations a framework for developing abilities for 
anticipating and coping with change.” Schendel and Patton (1978) work out a 
simultaneous equation model of corporate strategy. They refer the strategic concept to 
multiple levels: the corporate level, the business level, and the functional area level. 
Hofer (1980) discusses two types of corporate turnaround strategies: strategic and 
operating. His discussion leads to a conclusion that strategic turnarounds most often 
involve a significant shift in the nature of the business. Managers adopting operating 
turnaround strategy refocus their energies on the core business by choosing to emphasize 
                                                 
13 Few examples: (i) Strategy is a series of actions by a firm that are decided on according to the particular 
situation. – Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947; (ii) Strategies are directional action decisions which are 
required competitively to achieve the company’s purpose. – Cannon, 1968; (iii) Strategies are forward-
looking plans that anticipate change and initiate action to take advantage of opportunities that are integrated 
into the concepts or mission of the company – Newman & Logan, 1971; (iv) Strategy is concerned with 
long-range objectives and ways of pursuing them that affect the system as a whole. – Ackoff, 1974; (v) 
Strategy is a meditating force between the organization and its environment: consistent patterns in streams 
of organizational decisions to deal with the environment – Mintzberg – 1979. 
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one of the four following areas: increasing revenues, decreasing costs, decreasing assets, 
or a combination effort.  
2.3.3 Turnarounds 
Schendel et al. (1975) studied 54 firms each with four consecutive years of 
earnings decline and then subsequently four consecutive years of earnings improvement. 
They use information from business periodicals regarding these firms to study the causes 
of decline and actions taken for successful turnaround. They subjectively rate the causes 
for decline and actions taken for turnaround and classify each as either strategic or 
operating in nature. Hofer (1980) applied similar logic to his research. His analysis of 12 
poorly performing firms showed firms that became distressed on account of poor 
strategic decisions successively had “strategic” turnarounds. Those firms’ whose cause of 
distress resulted from poor operating decisions made “operating” turnarounds. Bibeault 
(1982) surveyed 81 chief executives who had faced turnaround situations. His discussions 
with the professionals attempting turnarounds add invaluable insights into issues such as 
leadership aspects as well as organizational and human issues. In his view, the primary 
objectives for the financially distressed firm are survival and achievement of a positive 
cash flow.  
Hambrick and Schecter (1983) argued against the dichotomy of classifying 
turnaround actions as “strategic” and “operational” since the distinction between 
classifications have blurred. The sample for their study is drawn from PIMS database14. 
The target sample was the available data over four years on all mature industrial-product 
                                                 
14 Profit Impact of Market Strategies (PIMS) is a large scale statistical study of environmental, strategic, 
and performance variables of individual business units.  
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businesses15 in the PIMS database. A total of 260 businesses met their required criterion 
for low performance including those that subsequently made performance improvements. 
Their cluster analysis indicated three primary successful turnaround actions: asset/cost 
surgery, selective product/market pruning, and a piecemeal strategy. Robbins and Pearce 
(1992) address the turnaround process in terms of retrenchment and recovery. In the 
retrenchment phase, they hypothesize firms seek to stabilize declining performance 
through reductions in costs and fixed assets. In the recovery phase, systematic 
investments are made to stimulate financial improvement. Their research design 
constrained their sample to firms that faced reasonably similar operating and competitive 
conditions. Their sample consisted of firms belonging to a single specific industry 
(Textile). They concluded that successful turnarounds were often a result of efficiency 
moves rather than of product-market changes or of market share increases.  
Hoshi et al. (1990) find the financially distressed group of firms invest more and 
sell more than non-group firms in the years following the onset of financial distress; 
Asquith et al. (1994) analyze firms that issued junk bonds in the 1970s and 80s and 
subsequently experienced financial trouble. Consistent with Ofek (1993), their study 
shows that distressed firms undertake restructuring primarily by selling assets. Sharpe 
(1994) shows a statistically and economically significant relationship between a firm’s 
financial leverage and the cyclicality of its labor force. He shows that firms that 
experience relatively high opportunity costs of capital during cyclical downturns are 
prone to reduce employment so as to conserve their working capital at such times. John et 
                                                 
15 A mature business is defined by PIMS as one in an industry whose real growth is less than 10 percent 
annually, in which most potential buyers understand the product, and whose set of competitors is well 
known. 
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al. (1992) study a sample of large firms (firms with assets exceeding $1 billion) with a 
performance decline in the sample period (at least one year of negative earnings (1980-
1987), followed by at least 3 years of positive earnings). They find strong evidence of 
changes in operations and investment to these performance shocks. These changes they 
find are result of voluntary actions by the firm managers and not in reaction to a threat of 
change in corporate control. Their study suggested that the firms retrenched16 quickly, 
and on average concentrated their focus. In the year following negative earnings, average 
employment fell by about 5% and the average number of business segments declined. 
The arguments presented by the above two papers and others suggest that firms with 
declining performance often choose to sell assets as they go through the restructuring 
process.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) discuss the nature of asset illiquidity especially in the 
context of distress firms. They argue that when firms have trouble meeting debt payments 
and sell assets, the highest valuation potential buyers of these assets are likely to be other 
firms in the same industry. But with the possibility of a contagion effect, these firms 
themselves are likely to have trouble meeting their debt payments. The other probable 
group of buyers of these assets, industry outsiders, would face agency costs of hiring 
specialists to run these assets and may fear overpaying for lack of proper knowledge of 
the assets characteristics. Hence when industry buyers cannot buy the assets and industry 
outsiders face significant costs of acquiring and managing the assets, assets in liquidation 
fetch prices below value in best use, which is the value when managed by specialist. 
                                                 
16 Defined as reduction in firm assets and/or costs. 
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In addition to asset sales and layoffs, capital expenditure reductions also play a 
role in restructuring of a distressed firm. In examining financially distressed companies 
that previously issued high yield junk bonds, Asquith et al. (1994) show that eighty-three 
percent of firms reduce capital expenditures from the year before the onset of distress to 
the year after. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) examine the investment behavior of 
financially distressed firms that remain in good economic health. They find that firms in 
financial distress but in good economic health decrease their capital investment 
expenditures, sell assets at depressed prices, but do not undertake riskier investment 
projects. 
Kane and Richardson (2002)’s sample of financial distress firms include firms 
that have high likelihood of impending failure but have not yet filed for bankruptcy 
protection. They consider such firms to no longer be ‘going concerns’. Their focus is 
primarily on two potentially mitigating actions – growth or contraction of plant 
investment and the likelihood that either action will lead to emergence from financial 
distress, thereby reducing the risk of corporate failure. They conclude in favor of 
contraction stating that disinvestment increases the likelihood of the firm getting out of 
distress. Cleary et al. (2004) develop a model of a U-shaped relation between investment 
and internal funds. As is standard, the firm invests less when it faces a decrease in 
internal funds. For low levels of internal funds, however, the firm must invest more to 
generate enough revenues to meet its contractual obligations. Investments therefore form 
a U-shape over all internal fund levels. Moyen (2004) also graphs a U-shaped relation 
between investment and cash flows for unconstrained firms. In bad conditions, firms 
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invest more to generate more revenues next period, thereby decreasing the probability of 
defaulting and paying default costs. 
Bhagat et al. (2005) document negative cash flow sensitivity for distressed firms 
with operating losses and a positive sensitivity for all other firms. They also show that the 
negative cash flow sensitivity is generated by distressed firms with operating losses that 
invest more than the previous years. These firms invest more when their cash flows are 
decreasing. They claim that this additional investment is made on account of funds raised 
by equity claimants and infer this as evidence of a gamble for resurrection. They also 
provide evidence consistent with an asset substitution problem only for the subset of 
financially distressed firms with operating losses that invest more than the previous year. 
2.4 The Sample and Variables 
2.4.1 The Sample Selection Process 
The initial sample consists of all companies drawn from COMPUSTAT during 
the period 1989 to 2001 that had financial data available for six contiguous fiscal years. 
Three consecutive years of data is required to compute the measure of distress.  The 
following three consecutive year restriction is needed to test the financial condition three 
years hence. The returns data is extracted from the CRSP database. Using Ohlson’s 
methodology, probabilistic predictions of bankruptcy are computed for each firm year in 
the total sample. Following Bhagat, et al. (2005) firms with 50% or greater probability 
are counted as financially distressed firms. The total sample size of all distressed firms is 
18,434 firm-years. The rest of the sample for which the probability of distress is less than 
50% is treated as non-distressed firms for the respective years for which the probabilities 
are computed. The total sample size of all non distressed firms is 30,948 firm-years. 
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Schendel et al., (1975) provide a concrete definition of upturn as four consecutive 
years of increasing profits. Among Hofer’s (1980) successful turnarounds, the average 
elapsed time from trough to peak was three years. Bibeault(1982) noted that the time 
required for a turnaround is a function of the size of the organization: “Altogether, we are 
talking about anywhere between one and three years, with a $20 million company taking 
one year and a company the size of Memorex taking three years”. For this study, I am 
considering turnaround as a firm in distress in year t and out of distress t+3 years hence. 
Thus, for each year the firms are in distress, the measure of distress (O-score) is 
recomputed for all such firms three years hence. These two steps lead to the formation of 
my sample of firms that ‘remain in distress’ and firms that had ‘successful turnaround’. 
This database now reflects each firm’s financial position as healthy or in distress after the 
three year measurement period, identifying if the distress firm made a recovery three 
years after being classified as distressed. A total of 3,050 firm-years or 16.5% of the total 
distressed sample successfully completed a turnaround three years after entering distress. 
The control and test variables were also obtained from COMPUSTAT.  
2.4.2 Control Variables 
The empirical literature cited earlier with regard to turnaround strategies suggests 
that suitability and effectiveness of turnaround strategies are dependent on certain 
intrinsic factors. These factors are relevant to a firm’s financial condition and impact the 
direction and intensity of decline or recovery. They are generally not altered significantly 
in magnitude by manager’s actions in a short duration. Size is computed as log of total 
assets (Item #6); Leverage is computed as total liabilities divided by total assets (Item 
#181/#6);  Operating Income standardized by total assets (item #13/#6); growth 
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opportunities for the firm proxied by Tobin’s Q – and computed as market value of assets 
divided by book value of assets ({(#199 * #25) + #6 – (#60 + #74)} / #6) and cash 
holdings (#1). 
2.4.3 Test Variables 
The objective of this paper is to observe and identify those distinguishing 
managerial actions that contribute significantly towards a successful turnaround of a 
distressed firm. Based on the assumption that significant changes in managerial decisions 
will be reflected in the financial statements, I compute the changes observed in certain 
specific variables and analyze their impact on the firm’s health three years hence. A time 
period of three years is allowed to pass by to study the impact of those decisions – a 
justifiably conservative approach for the manager’s actions to work through the firm’s 
operations. These specific factors have been addressed in earlier papers but either have 
yielded contrary results or have not been explained in regards to recovery from distress. 
For firms in distress, changes are observed and recorded for these following factors: (i) 
Change in acquisitions (item #129) ((Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988), (ii) Change 
in capital expenditure (item #128) (Kang and Shivdasani, 1997, Bhagat, Moyen and Suh, 
2005), (iii) change in working capital (item #4-#5) (Kang and Shivdasani, 1997), (iv) 
change in equity (item #216) (Slatter, 1984; John, Lang, and Netter 1992), (v) change in 
research and development (item # 46) (Guerard et al., 1987)17 and (vi) change in net 
income (item #172) (Schendel et al., 1975). Table 14 discusses the variables to be used in 
this paper. 
  
                                                 
17 Guerard et al, (1987) model R&D expenditures as a function of previous years’ R&D expenses and hence 
use the raw changes in R&D expenditures when analyzing the corporate financial policy. 
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Table 14. Variable Construction 
 
S.No Variable 
Notation 
Variable Description Compustat  
Notation 
1. Size Natural logarithm of total assets Ln(#6t) 
2. Cash  Cash Holdings #1 t 
3. Tobin’s Q Market value of assets / Book Value of assets {(#199 t * #25 t) + #6 t 
– (#60 t + #74 t)} / #6 t 
4. Leverage Total Debt / Total Assets #181 t / #6 t 
5. Operating 
Income. 
Operating Income/Total Assets #13 t /#6 t 
6. O-Score Yit = -1.32 - .407*(ln(TA)) + 6.03*TLTA – 
1.43*WCTA + .757*CLCA – 2.37*NITA – 
1.83*FUTL + .285*INTWO – 1.72OENEG - 
.521*CHIN 
 
  Ln(TA) Ln(#6 t) 
  TLTA #181 t /#6 t 
  WCTA (#4 t - #5 t) / #6 t 
  CLCA #5 t /#4 t 
  NITA 
FUTL 
INTWO 
 
OENEG 
 
CHIN 
#172 t /#6 t 
#110 t /#181 t 
1 if #172t & #172t-1 < 
0; 0 otherwise.  
1 if #181 t > #6 t; 0 
otherwise.  
(NIt – NIt-1)/(|NIt| - 
|NIt-1|) 
7.  Chg in 
R&D 
R&Dt+1 – R&Dt #46t+1 - #46t 
8. Chg in 
CAPX 
Capital Expenditurest+1 – Capital Expenditurest #128t+1 - #128t  
9. Chg in 
Acq. 
Aquisitionst+1 – Acquisitionst  #129t+1 - #129t 
10 Chg in WC Working Capitalt+1 – Working Capitalt (#5-#4)t+1–(#5-#4)t 
11. Chg in 
Equity 
Shareholders’ Equityt+1 – Shareholders Equityt #216t+1 - #216t 
12. Chg in NI Net Incomet+1 – Net Incomet #172t+1 - #172t 
13. Returns           Annual returns     CRSP Database 
This table details the construction of the distress variable (based on the probabilistic 
predictions of bankruptcy as derived from Ohlson’s score), control variables, and test 
variables. 
 
2.5 Measures of Financial Distress  
The goal is to use a method that reflects decline in performance leading to varying 
degree of financial distress. Prior research has considered negative net income as a sign 
of financial trouble with most of them having considered more than one year of negative 
net income to classify a firm as financially distressed. Some other methods applied to 
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capture the financial distress status of firms are as follows: Fazzari et al. (1988) consider 
firms with negative real sales growth as financially distressed firms. Wruck (1990) 
defines financial distress as a situation where cash flow is insufficient to cover current 
obligations. Hoshi et al. (1990) assume a firm is approaching distress when the ratio of 
operating income to interest expense (interest coverage) falls below one. Asquith, 
Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) define financial distress in the most fundamental way, 
i.e., liquidation value of a firm’s asset is less than the face value of the firm’s liabilities. 
Ofek (1993) constructs a distressed firm sample by including firms that experience a year 
of average or above average performance (base year) followed by a year of very poor 
performance (distress year), defined as annual stock returns in the bottom decile of the 
market. Opler and Titman (1994) identify industries that have experienced economic 
distress and differentiate firms in those industries based on their leverage ratios. A 3-digit 
SIC industry is defined as being economically distressed when its median sales growth is 
negative and when it experiences median stock returns below -30%. Ciccone (2001) uses 
proxy for financial distress with a bottom line focus. He considers a firm in financial 
distress if it has losses, (i.e. earningst < 0), and earnings decline (i.e. actual annual 
earningst < actual annual earningst-1).  
In addition to the above measures a more comprehensive way to classify firms on 
the continuum is to compute the probability of a firm becoming bankrupt. The two 
methodologies most commonly applied in the literature are accounting-based measures of 
distress risk – (i) Z-score (Altman, 1968) and (ii) O-score (Ohlson, 1980). Altman (1968) 
investigates a set of financial ratios in bankruptcy prediction context using a multiple 
discriminant statistical methodology. Ohlson (1980) uses maximum likelihood estimation 
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of the so-called conditional logit model to predict corporate failure as evidenced by the 
event of bankruptcy. They identify four basic factors as being statistically significant in 
affecting the probability of failure within one year – (i) size; (ii) measures of financial 
structure; (iii) measures of performance; and (iv) measures of current liquidity. 
In this paper, I use Ohlson’s probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy measure very 
closely imitating Bhagat, Moyen and Suh’s (2005) use of the same measure to identify 
firms in performance decline. This measure is based on Ohlson’s predicted bankruptcy 
probabilities p, where 
P = 1 / (1 + e-Yit) 
Yit = -1.32 - .407*(ln (TA)) + 6.03*TLTA – 1.43*WCTA + .757*CLCA – 
2.37*NITA – 1.83*FUTL + .285*INTWO – 1.72OENEG - .521*CHIN 
Where TA is total assets (COMPUSTAT #s in parentheses) (#6); TLTA is total 
liabilities to total assets (#181/#6); WCTA is the ratio of working capital to total assets 
[(#4 - #5) / #6]; CLCA is the current liabilities to current assets ratio (#5/#4); NITA is net 
income to total assets ratio (#172/#6) and FUTL is fund from operations to total liabilities 
ratio (#110/#181). INTWO = 1 if net income (#172) is negative in previous two years or 
zero otherwise; ONEEG = 1 if total liabilities (#181) is greater than total assets (#6), 0 
otherwise and CHIN is the ratio of the difference in net income of the current period with 
the previous period over the absolute value of the difference. (NIt – NIt-1)/ (|NIt| - |NIt-1|).  
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Table 15A. Non-Distressed vs. Distressed Firms - Summary Statistics 
         
Non-Distressed Firms Distressed Firms   
Variable Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Difference 
Total Assets 30,948 5.4176 18,434 4.3947  1.0229*** 
Leverage 30,948 0.3911 18,434 0.6976 -0.3065*** 
Operating Income / 
TA 30,948 0.1239 18,434 -0.0429  0.1668*** 
Q 30,948 2.1071 18,434 2.3176 -0.2104 
Cash  30,948 186.0336 18,434 51.9170  134.12*** 
O-Score 30,948 -1.9044 18,434 1.3788 -3.2832*** 
Ohlson’s probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy measure is used to distinguish between 
healthy or distressed status. The measure predicts bankruptcy probabilities p, where 
P = 1 / (1 + e-Yit) 
Yit = -1.32 - .407*(ln(TA)) + 6.03*TLTA – 1.43*WCTA + .757*CLCA – 2.37*NITA – 
1.83*FUTL + .285*INTWO – 1.72OENEG - .521*CHIN 
Wherein TA is total assets (COMPUSTAT #s in parentheses) (#6); TLTA is total 
liabilities to total assets (#181/#6); WCTA is the ratio of working capital to total assets 
[(#4 - #5) / #6]; CLCA is the current liabilities to current assets ratio (#5/#4); NITA is net 
income to total assets ratio (#172/#6) and FUTL is fund from operations to total liabilities 
ratio (#110/#181). INTWO = 1 if net income (#172) is negative in previous two years or 
zero otherwise; ONEEG = 1 if total liabilities (#181) is greater than total assets (#6), 0 
otherwise and CHIN is the ratio of the difference in net income of current period with 
previous period over the absolute value of the difference. (NIt – NIt-1)/(|NIt| - |NIt-1|).  
            Size is computed as log of total assets (Item #6); Leverage is computed as total 
liabilities divided by total assets (Item #181/#6); Operating Income standardized by total 
assets (item #13/#6); Growth opportunities for the firm proxied by Tobin’s Q – and 
computed as market value of assets divided by book value of assets ({(#199 * #25) + #6 
– (#60 + #74)} / #6), Cash holdings (#1). 
 
Following Bhagat, et al. (2005), this measure is obtained from a variant of 
Ohlson’s bankruptcy probability model. Because the FUTL variable greatly restricts the 
sample size, pseudo-bankruptcy probabilities, ˜p, are calculated by ignoring the effect of 
FUTL in predicting bankruptcy probabilities:   
˜p = 1/ (1 + e-Yit) 
Firms with declining performance and facing financial distress include firm-year 
observations with pseudo-bankruptcy probabilities greater than or equal to 50%. Panel A 
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of Table 15 compares the distressed sample used in this paper to a sample of non-
distressed firm. This table justifies the choice of the distress measure (O-score) used in 
this paper in determining and labeling firms’ financial condition as distressed or not 
distressed. I look at some important firm variables and see if the O-score appears to 
predict firms with distressed characteristics. By comparing the sample of firms not 
considered in distress with the firms that are considered in distress, we see the distressed 
sample appears to be accurately predicted by O-score. I further examine control variable 
to identify differences between a typical firm in distress as compared to a firm not in 
distress. Total asset size is a key variable in determining the distress level of firms, as 
shown by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995). The size of the firm is a proxy for both the 
flexibility and internal slack available to the declining firm. The firms in distress are 
expected to be of smaller size and this is observed using a measure of size, which is the 
natural log of total assets. Leverage is also a key determinant in distress level (Kaplan 
and Stein, 1993). It is expected that firms with higher leverage, on average, to be in 
distress more often. Consistent with this prediction the firms in distress have doubled the 
amount of leverage as compared to non-distressed firms in the sample.  
Operating income is also an important determinant in figuring out firm distress 
level (Ciccone, 2001). Firms with lower and especially negative operating income on 
average will find themselves in distress. Consistent with the idea, firms identified as 
distressed have a negative operating income on average, while the non-distressed firms in 
the sample have positive operating income. A firm’s Q, as a proxy for investment 
opportunities, does not appear to affect the firm’s distress level (Opler and Titman, 1993). 
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Table 15B. Non-Distressed vs. Distressed Firms – Industry Concentration 
              
  Distressed Firms 
Non-Distressed 
Firms 
SIC 
Code
% of 
sample 
SIC 
Code 
% of 
sample 
Business Services 73 10.89% 73 9.15% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 28 7.27% 28 9.38% 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 49 6.85% 49 3.64% 
Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment 
And Components, Except Computer 
Equipment 36 6.72% 36 9.92% 
Industrial And Commercial Machinery And 
Computer Equipment 35 6.34% 35 7.75% 
Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling 
Instruments; Photographic, Medical And 
Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks 38 5.92% 38 8.04% 
Oil And Gas Extraction 13 4.94% 13 3.53% 
Communications 48 4.36% 48 2.43% 
Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 50 2.80% 50 2.68% 
Eating And Drinking Places* 58 2.59%  -  - 
Food And Kindred Products*  -  - 20 3.01% 
The industry concentration for the top ten industries of distressed and non-distressed 
firms, respectively, are measured and reported here. A total of 18,434 firm-year sample 
size of distress firms and 30,948 firm-year non-distressed firm sample size is considered 
for the sample period of 1989-2004. Industry classification and description information is 
gathered from U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety & Health administration 
website manual. http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html 
* Only top ten industries for distressed and non-distressed firms shown here.  
 
Specifically, distressed firms have higher investment opportunities as defined by 
Q but not by a significant amount. Distressed firms hold a fraction of the cash as firms 
not in distress. John (1993) argues that firms hold more cash as avoidance to financial 
distress. Panel B of Table 15 examines the industry concentration of firms not in distress 
versus the industry concentration of firms that are in distress. The panel demonstrates that 
some industries have a higher probability of having firms in distress. The industry SIC 
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code with the highest concentration for the distressed sample is SIC code 73 (Business 
Services). This SIC code makes up almost 11 percent of the total distressed sample, while 
making up approximately 9 percent of the total non-distressed sample. In contrast, SIC 
code 36 (Electronics and other Electrical Equipment Components) makes up 6.72 percent 
of the distressed sample but almost 10 percent of the non-distressed sample. These results 
demonstrate the variation among different industries and the different levels of risk 
among industries (Hou and Robinson, 2006). Certain industries have a higher probability 
of firms entering distress than others. This highlights the need for industry controls.  
2.6 Empirical Results 
2.6.1 Sample Statistics and Univariate Tests 
Table 16 examines the sample statistics for the whole sample of firms in distress 
for the given year, the firms that made it out of distress in a three year period and the 
sample of firms that did not make it out of distress in three years. The sample of firms 
that made it out of distress represents about 15% of the entire sample of firms in distress, 
while the remainder are firms that did not exit distress in the three year period. I compare 
the difference between the variables for the two types of firms to examine if these 
variables appear to estimate the successful exit from distress.  
The results indicate firms making it out of distress in the three year period have 
significant differences on average than firms remaining in distress. Firms getting out of 
distress in a three year time period are larger in size as measured by total assets, have less 
leverage, and have higher cash holdings.  
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Table 16. Sample Statistics 
 
Variable Full Sample Out of Distress Still in Distress Difference 
Observations 18,434 3,055 15,379 -12,324 
Size 4.3947 4.5577 4.3624  0.1953*** 
Leverage 0.6976 0.6204 0.7129 -0.0924*** 
Oper. Income / TA -0.0429 -0.0152 -0.0484   0.0332** 
Q 2.3176 2.1014 2.3604 -0.2590 
Cash 51.9170 77.6547 46.8130  30.841*** 
Chg in R&D 0.8920 3.4126 0.2509   3.1617** 
Chg in CAPX 0.5504 -5.3226 2.0408 -7.3634*** 
Chg in Acq. -3.0196 -2.8534 -3.0618  0.2085 
Chg in WC 8.7819 12.0342 7.9548  4.0795*** 
Chg in Equity -1.3049 0.0682 -1.6542  1.7223 
Chg in NI 18.6210 39.4163 13.3320  26.084*** 
Ohlson’s probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy measure is used to distinguish between 
healthy or distressed firm status. The measure predicts bankruptcy probabilities p, where 
P = 1 / (1 + e-Yit) 
Yit = -1.32 - .407*(ln(TA)) + 6.03*TLTA – 1.43*WCTA + .757*CLCA – 2.37*NITA – 
1.83*FUTL + .285*INTWO – 1.72OENEG - .521*CHIN 
Wherein TA is total assets (COMPUSTAT #s in parentheses) (#6); TLTA is total 
liabilities to total assets (#181/#6); WCTA is the ratio of working capital to total assets 
[(#4 - #5) / #6]; CLCA is the current liabilities to current assets ratio (#5/#4); NITA is net 
income to total assets ratio (#172/#6) and FUTL is fund from operations to total liabilities 
ratio (#110/#181). INTWO = 1 if net income (#172) is negative in previous two years or 
zero otherwise; ONEEG = 1 if total liabilities (#181) is greater than total assets (#6), 0 
otherwise and CHIN is the ratio of the difference in net income of current period with 
previous period over the absolute value of the difference. (NIt – NIt-1)/(|NIt| - |NIt-1|).  
Size is computed as log of total assets (Item #6); Leverage is computed as total liabilities 
divided by total assets (Item #181/#6); Operating Income standardized by total assets 
(item #13/#6); Growth opportunities for the firm proxied by Tobin’s Q – and computed 
as market value of assets divided by book value of assets ({(#199 * #25) + #6 – (#60 + 
#74)} / #6), Cash holdings (#1). 
 
The change variables are all computed as a first difference year (t+1) – (t). The 
year t is the year in which firm is identified as being in distress. The change variables are 
computed for Change in acquisitions (item #129); Change in capital expenditure (item 
#128); change in working capital (item #4-#5); change in equity (item #216); change in 
research and development (item # 46); and change in net income (item #172) 
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The next set of variables focus on changes made in the first year after a firm 
enters distress. The average change in R&D is significantly higher for firms getting 
themselves out of distress during the three year period. Thus, this finding suggests that 
distressed firms that increase their investment in R&D have a greater incidence of 
turnaround. Changes in other types of investments do not share this positive relation with 
successfully exiting distress. For example, changes in capital expenditures (CAPEX) are 
negative, as firms leaving the distress group have lower capital expenditures on average. 
Acquisitions do not appear to affect firms’ ability to get out of distress, as change in 
acquisition level is not significantly different for the two samples. Working capital 
measures the firm’s net position in liquid assets. Change in working capital is much 
higher for firms getting out of distress (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). Selling equity does 
not appear to be different among the two groups, as they do not have a significant 
difference in changes in equity. The change in yearly net income is much greater for 
firms getting out of distress.   
Table 17 provides a correlation matrix for all variables to be used in the 
regressions. This table examines the correlation between the independent variables. I find 
that the correlation coefficient between most of the variables is fairly low. One 
coefficient that does provide some concern is the relation of leverage and operating 
income standardized by assets. This variable has a correlation coefficient of 0.4225. This 
high correlation may cause issues in the regressions, so I run the main regression with 
and without both variables at the same time. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test were 
also run to analyze further if any multicollinearity existed among independent variables.
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Table 17. Correlation Matrix 
  Size Leverage Income/TA Q 
Chg in 
R&D Chg in CAPX 
Chg in 
Acq. 
Chg in 
WC 
Chg in 
Equity 
Chg in 
NI 
Size 1 
Leverage 0.0015 1 
(0.8343) 
Income/TA 0.2095 -0.4225 1 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
Q -0.0954 0.1056 -0.1657 1 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000 
Chg in R&D 0.0269 0.0031 0.0077 0.0006 1 
(0.0008) (0.7001) (0.3386) (0.9440 
Chg in CAPX 0.0100 0.0013 0.0042 0.0005 0.2959 1 
(0.2151) (0.8769) (0.6047) (0.9470 (0.0000) 
Chg in Acq. -0.0491 -0.0024 -0.0007 0.0032 0.0154 0.0156 1 
(0.0000) (0.7632) (0.9319) (0.6931 (0.0560) (0.0538) 
Chg in WC 0.0348 0.0047 0.0047 0.0009 0.1017 -0.1982 -0.0589 1 
(0.0000) (0.5593) (0.5563) (0.9081 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Chg in Equity -0.0151 -0.0074 0.0031 -0.0017 -0.0379 0.0537 0.1801 -0.0589 1 
(0.0608) (0.3573) (0.6994) (0.8341 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (.0139) 
Chg in NI 0.0997 0.0133 0.0006 -0.0024 0.1137 -0.1750 0.0175 0.2041 -0.0620 1 
(0.0000) (0.0989) (0.9417) (0.7696)      (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0356) (0.0000) 
This table provides data on the correlations between certain variable measures. The dataset is comprised of 30,948 firm year 
observations covering the period 1989 through 2004. Size is computed as log of total assets (Item #6); Leverage is computed as total 
liabilities divided by total assets (Item #181/#6); Operating Income standardized by total assets (item #13/#6); Growth opportunities 
for the firm proxied by Tobin’s Q – and computed as market value of assets divided by book value of assets ({(#199 * #25) + #6 – 
(#60 + #74)} / #6), Cash holdings (#1). The change variables are all computed as a first difference year (t+1) – (t). The year t is the 
year in which firm is identified as being in distress. The change variables are computed for Change in acquisitions (item #129) capital 
expenditure (item #128); working capital (item #4-#5); equity (item #216); research and development (item # 46); and net income 
(item #172) 
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 The largest VIF measure18 was observed for the operating income variable (1.47) 
and the over-all mean VIF was 1.17.  
2.6.2 Multivariate Tests  
Table 18 shows a probit model measuring whether the firm has remained in 
distress, equaling zero, or if the firm has exited distress, equaling one. I use this probit 
model to measure the likelihood of the independent variables to explain which firms are 
more likely to exit distress. I find that many different ex ante variables measuring the 
condition of the firm and changes the firm makes over their first year of distress are 
significant in predicting the success of firms exiting distress. In the first column, I 
measure the condition of the firm with several controls and examine changes in assets 
and changes in financing. The regression coefficient for size, as measured by the natural 
log of total assets, is positive and statistically significant.  Larger firms are more likely to 
get out of distress as compared to smaller firms. Leverage is negative and statistically 
significant in the regression with a coefficient of -0.6167. Firms with higher amounts of 
leverage are much less likely to come out of distress. High fixed payments make it 
extremely hard for firms to overcome distress. The coefficient for income over assets is 
negative and statistically significant and the coefficient for Q is insignificant in the 
regression.  
The next set of variables measure changes that occur in the first year of distress to 
see if these changes increase or decrease the probability of the firm exiting distress. The 
change variables proxy the managers’ ‘turnaround’ decisions in reaction to the financial 
distress. The first three variables measure if the firm’s use of resources in the first year of 
                                                 
18 Variance inflation factor (VIF) measures the impact of collinearity among the independent variables’ in a 
regression model on the precision of estimation. Typically a VIF value greater than 10 is of concern. 
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distress impacts the distress status of the firm. Consistent with the univariate evidence, 
change in R&D is positive and significant. Firms that increase their R&D spending 
increase the likelihood of getting out of distress. Support for this result can be traced back 
to the arguments presented by Hofer (1980). Hofer categorizes turnaround strategies into 
two broad types: ‘operating’ and ‘strategic’. ‘Operating’ turnaround strategies place 
emphasis on increasing revenues, decreasing costs, decreasing assets or a combination of 
these. ‘Strategic’ turnarounds involve either changing strategy for competing in the same 
line of business or calls for entering a new business. Hofer states that employing 
turnaround strategies to ‘save’ the existing business involves emphasis on functional area 
by increasing investments in marketing, production, and/or engineering. The observed 
increase in R&D spending by firms leading to successful turnaround can be attributed to 
‘strategic’ turnaround technique employed by the management. The change in CAPEX 
coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that an increase in spending on capital 
expenditures decreases the likelihood of exiting distress. This result is consistent with the 
main results of Kane and Richardson (2002). The coefficient for change in acquisitions is 
insignificant, as the level of acquisitions by firms under distress does not impact distress 
status of the firm.  
The next two variables measure if financing activities of the firm matter to the 
distress status of the firm. The coefficient of the change in working capital variable is 
insignificant. The coefficient for change in the amount of common or preferred stock is 
also insignificant. These variables display the irrelevance of a few of the financing 
activities of firms.  
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Table 18. Multivariate Tests: Probit Analysis 
 
  (1) (2) 
Total Assets 0.0968 0.0920 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Leverage -0.6167 -0.6172 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Income / TA -0.0937 
(0.02) 
Q -0.0025 0.003 
(0.51) (0.93) 
Chg in R&D 0.0003 0.0003 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Chg in CAPX -0.0002 -0.0002 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Chg in Acq. 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.97) (0.99) 
Chg in WC 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.89) (0.87) 
Chg in Equity 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.98) (0.97) 
Chg in NI 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.03) (0.02) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Constant -0.4607 -0.4437 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Number of Obs. 14649 14649 
Pseudo R-squared 0.055 0.054 
The probit model measures whether the firm has remained in distress, equaling zero, or if 
the firm has exited distress, equaling one. A total of 18,434 distressed firm-year sample 
size is considered for the sample period of 1989-2004. Of these, 18,434 distressed firm-
year sample size 3,040 firm-years exit financial distress condition over three year time 
period. Size is computed as log of total assets (Item #6); Leverage is computed as total 
liabilities divided by total assets (Item #181/#6); Operating Income standardized by total 
assets (item #13/#6); Growth opportunities for the firm proxied by Tobin’s Q – and 
computed as market value of assets divided by book value of assets ({(#199 * #25) + #6 
– (#60 + #74)} / #6), Cash holdings (#1). The change variables are all computed as a first 
difference year (t+1) – (t). The year t is the year in which firm is identified as being in 
distress. The change variables are computed for Change in acquisitions (item #129); 
Change in capital expenditure (item #128); change in working capital (item #4-#5); 
change in equity (item #216); change in research and development (item # 46); and 
change in net income (item #172). 
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Change in net income looks to capture if year one performance has an impact on 
the firm distress status. This variable is positive and statistically significant as a good first 
year in terms of better income will increase the likelihood of firms getting out of distress. 
Both year and industry dummies were used in this regression.  
Given a potential issue with multicollinearity I drop operating income to total 
assets in column (2) of the regression to ensure that the earlier results are accurate. 
Dropping this variable does not change any of the major results in column (1). After 
illustrating the predictive ability of distress I then focus my attention on why that is 
important.         
The previous result showing increased investment in R&D is associated with 
greater likelihood of turnaround seems plausible for higher growth firms for which 
investments in technology can add value to the firm.  It is of interest to investigate 
whether the R&D finding is driven by high growth firms, or whether increased 
investment in R&D assists in turnaround for non high growth firms as well.  Thus, to 
further understand the role of increased R&D expenditures in aiding distressed firms' 
recovery , the probit model was run after dividing the sample into three distinct groups. 
Using the Q values, firms were differentiated into high, average and low growth firms. 
Firms with Q values greater than 2 were categorized as high growth firms. Firms with Q 
value between 1 and 2 were categorized as average growth firms and finally firms with Q 
value less than 1 were place in low growth category. 3,739 firm-years (25%), 7,749 firm-
years (51%), and 3695 firm-years (24%) respectively was the each sub-group sample 
size. The results of this probit regression are shown in Table 19. The findings are similar 
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to that of the total sample regression of table 18. For all three groups, I observe that 
probability of turnover increases with size and decreases with increase in leverage. 
Table 19. Multivariate Tests: Sample Differentiated by Growth Opportunities 
 
Hi_Growth  Avg_Growth  Lo_Growth 
Total Assets 0.0523  0.1288  0.1344 
(0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Leverage ‐0.2013  ‐1.2018  ‐1.4735 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Income / TA 0.0345  0.1640  0.1258 
(0.008)  (0.069)  (0.100) 
Q 0.0028  0.0697  0.0773 
(0.493)  (0.299)  (0.683) 
Chg in R&D 0.00001  0.00025  0.00020 
(0.294)  (0.077)  (0.039) 
Chg in CAPX ‐0.0011  ‐0.0001  -0.0007 
(0.065)  (0.005)  (0.061) 
Chg in Acq. 0.00007  0.00002  0.00008 
(0.948)  (0.766)  (0.850) 
Chg in WC 0.00004  0.00002  0.00002 
(0.807)  (0.756)  (0.761) 
Chg in Equity ‐0.00008  ‐0.00009  -0.00002 
(0.281)  (0.366)  (0.472) 
Chg in NI 0.00022  0.00003  0.00003 
(0.012)  (0.057)  (0.030) 
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant ‐0.688  ‐0.4437  -0.3740 
(0.003)  (0.017)  (0.096) 
Number of Obs. 3739  7749  3695 
Pseudo R-squared 0.055 0.0770 0.0734
The probit model measures whether the firm has remained in distress, equaling zero, or if 
the firm has exited distress, equaling one. The sample size is 18,434 distressed firm-year 
for the period of 1989-2004. Of these 3,040 firm-years exit financial distress condition 
over three year time period. The sample here is separated into three groups by their 
growth ranking. Firm-years with Q greater than 2 are grouped under “Hi-Growth”, 
between 1 and 2 Q value firms are considered here as average growth and firms with Q 
less than 1 are the Low Growth firms. Size Ln(Item #6); Leverage (Item #181/#6); 
Operating Income standardized by total assets (item #13/#6); Growth opportunities for 
the firm proxied by Tobin’s Q – and computed as market value of assets divided by book 
value of assets ({(#199 * #25) + #6 – (#60 + #74)} / #6), Cash holdings (#1). The change 
variables are all computed as a first difference year (t+1) – (t). The year t is the year in 
which firm is identified as being in distress. The change variables are computed for 
Change in acquisitions (item #129); Change in capital expenditure (item #128); change in 
working capital (item #4-#5); change in equity (item #216); change in research and 
development (item # 46); and change in net income (item #172). 
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 Increase in operating income increases the probability of successful turnover and 
hence I observe positive and significant coefficient for all three sub-groups. The 
important test variable, the change in R&D expenditures, shows a positive coefficient for 
all three groups but is significant only for average and low growth firms at 8% and 4% 
level, respectively. These findings suggest that firms with low to average growth 
opportunities who increase their investments in R&D may be able to recover from 
distress by focusing on product innovations or by improving the efficiency of their 
operations by investments in technology (e.g., through automating aspects of the 
production process). . The benefit of increasing R&D for high growth firms is not as 
distinct, perhaps because the degree of R&D spending in more rapidly growing firms is 
already relatively high.   
While it is expected that firms that are able to exit distress will perform better 
than firms that remain in a distress state, it is still of interest to measure the value of 
exiting distress from a shareholder wealth perspective.  Are the returns for firms out of 
distress significantly higher than those for firms that linger in a distress state, or is the 
difference in performance only marginal? Table 20 (Panel A) measures the three year 
return for the group of firms able to get out of distress and the firms still in distress for 
each individual year. The results of this table demonstrate the importance of exiting 
distress. For the entire sample, firms that can make it out of distress perform significantly 
better in terms of three-year returns as compared to the firms unable to emerge from 
distress. The difference in three-year returns between the out of distress versus the sample 
remaining in distress is around 37 percentage points. I also examine the three-year return 
for each year individually. I find the same result holds over each individual year over the 
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whole sample period. I do notice a variation of the return difference over time but each 
year is significantly greater for sample of firms that are able to make it out of distress. 
Each year is significant at the 1% level with the exception of 1996, which is significant at 
the 10% level. 
Table 20A. Comparison of 3-Year Returns for the two Samples and Over Time 
 
Time Period Out of Distress Still in Distress Difference 
Full Sample 1.0787 0.7049  0.3738*** 
1989 1.1809 0.4948  0.6861*** 
1990 1.5521 1.1512  0.4009*** 
1991 0.9219 0.6272 0.2947*** 
1992 0.8561 0.5541 0.302*** 
1993 0.9388 0.4425 0.4963*** 
1994 1.0273 0.6923 0.3358*** 
1995 1.0470 0.3851 0.6619*** 
1996 0.7796 0.6381 0.1415* 
1997 1.0935 0.4496 0.6439*** 
1998 1.1967 0.7292 0.4675*** 
1999 0.8825 0.1967 0.6858*** 
2000 1.4593 1.0235 0.4358*** 
2001 1.2478 0.9472 0.3006*** 
The returns are acquired from CRSP database. A total of 18,434 distressed firm-year 
sample size is considered for the sample period of 1989-2004. Of the 18,434 firm-year 
3,040 firm-years exited out of distress. The returns shown here are three-year returns. 
The ‘out of distress’ column tabulates three-year returns for the total sample for firms 
that were in distress at certain point in time and three years hence had a successful 
turnaround. The ‘still in distress’ column lists three-year returns of firms that were in 
distress at certain point in time and continued to be in financial distress post three years. 
 
Further panel B of Table 20 uses abnormal returns computed over three year 
period using market adjusted returns. It is observed that the interpretation of panel A 
continues to hold even when abnormal returns are used in place of three-year buy and 
hold returns. The results for the three-year returns provide two findings for the paper. 
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Table 20B. Comparison of 3-year Abnormal Returns for the two Samples and Over Time 
Time Period Out of Distress Still in Distress Difference 
Full Sample 0.4124 0.1703 0.2421*** 
1989 0.6809 0.1403 0.5406*** 
1990 0.3060 0.1989 0.1070 
1991 0.2640 0.1572 0.1069 
1992 0.1301 0.0096 0.1205* 
1993 0.3801 0.0800 0.3001*** 
1994 0.3286 0.0793 0.2492*** 
1995 0.5599 0.0754 0.4845*** 
1996 0.1341 0.1313 0.0028 
1997 0.2967 0.1860 0.1106* 
1998 0.4052 0.0480 0.3573*** 
1999 0.7537 0.2189 0.5348*** 
2000 0.6187 0.3995 0.2193* 
2001 0.7764 0.5764 0.2000** 
The returns are acquired from CRSP database. A total of 18,434 distressed firm-year 
sample size is considered for the sample period of 1989-2004. Of the 18,434 firm-year 
observations 3,040 firm-years exited out of distress. The returns shown here are three-
year abnormal returns. The ‘out of distress’ column tabulates three-year abnormal returns 
for the total sample for firms that were in distress at certain point in time and three years 
hence had a successful turnaround. The ‘still in distress’ column lists three-year 
abnormal returns of firms that were in distress at certain point in time and continued to be 
in financial distress three years hence. 
 
First, the market seems to agree with the O-score identification that these firms 
are indeed doing better than firms still in distress. So, three-year returns and the 
corresponding abnormal returns are much higher for firms exiting distress. Also, in table 
20 I define predictable ex-ante firm characteristics that can help us explain whether or not 
a firm increases their likelihood of getting out of distress. These predictable 
characteristics could help us identify firms, which are more likely to exit distress and 
have strong three-year returns. This could possibly increase the risk-return tradeoff for 
investors looking to find investment on riskier firms that are currently in distress.        
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2.7 Conclusions 
In this paper, I find firm turnaround is predictable with ex ante variables. Both 
firm characteristics and investment decision affect a firm’s likelihood to exit financial 
distress. Size, leverage, and income level at the time of distress all impact firm distress 
level. The primary result of the paper suggests that firms can take timely actions in 
response to distress. Investments in product development through research and 
development spending increase the probability of a firm making a successful turnaround. 
Further, I find that this increased R&D investment is even more important for firms with 
average and low growth opportunities. Other results, such as the relationship between 
capital expenditure reductions and recovery from distress, are consistent with previous 
studies. The finding suggest that firms may be able to increase the likelihood of exiting 
distress by reducing capital expenditures  and making investments in research and 
development which can lead to increased production efficiency or product innovations. 
Financial decisions do not have a significant effect on successful firm turnaround, 
suggesting that financing strategies during distress are not important in determining the 
success of a turnaround.   
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